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Current HISTORY

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CURRENT HISTORY

BOOKS OF THE MONTH

VOL. XXXI | JANUARY, 1930 | NO. 4

BOOKS—They come in an endless procession, day after day. On every conceivable subject — history, economics, sociology, religion, biography, morals, historical and other novels, poetry. Inevitably some of these many books will appeal to the Editor more than others. Every book, after all, must be seen and judged through the prism of a personality. The Editor must analyze and sift according to his individual predilections. Above all, he must be vigilant for significant tendencies and ideas.

E O Hoppe

THOMAS MANN

* * *

With this brief preface, our conviction may here be expressed that our American publishers are doing noble work for the dissemination of all kinds of important knowledge. And though, of course, they are conducting their business for commercial profit, and not from purely idealistic or altruistic motives, their range of interest and responsiveness to so many forms of intellectual, social and cultural progress is little less than amazing.

Perhaps first mention should be made of Thomas Mann, recently awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature. Undoubtedly Germany's greatest living writer today, a number of his works have appeared in English translation in the United States, and his American publisher (Knopf) is legitimately jubilant over this official and international confirmation of his own selective judgment.

Many writers have a complex biography. What is known of Mann's life is simple and uneventful. He was born in Lü[illegible], of an old patrician family. [illegible] 19 years old, his family [illegible]. There he worked in an [illegible] office, but on the side he studied [illegible]y literature and the humanities, which had for him an irresistible attraction. After a visit to Italy, he worked on the staff of *Simplicissimus*. Meanwhile, however, his literary talents were maturing. In 1894 he published *Gefallen*, which brought him sufficient recognition and encouragement to lead him to devote himself entirely to writing. In 1901 appeared his now famous *Buddenbrooks*, a remarkable character and regional novel laid mainly in Lübeck. An interesting fact about this work was that it was one of the first great novels to make a family group, rather than an individual, the hero. Here we have the foreshadowing of the modern drama of elderly conservatism versus youthful revolt which pervades so many of our modern works today.

But *Buddenbrooks*, notable as it was, was not Mann's only claim to receive the greatest literary honor which any writer can possibly receive today. The Nobel Prize is never awarded on the basis of a single work; it is reserved for those in whose writings are reflected the workings of a great mind absorbed in the gigantic and complex problem of humanity. Mann's literary development was to prove that he fitted within this definition, and his literary record has been one of ever-growing increase in prestige and recognition. In 1903 appeared a series of short stories. In 1915 came a novel, *Royal Highness*. Then, after *Death in Venice* and *Tonio Kröger*, a second long novel, *Der Zauberberg* (The Magic Mountain). This work might be defined as a great intellectual drama of the forces playing on the mentality of the modern man. Laid in a tuberculosis sanatorium in the Swiss mountains, it reveals the vital weaknesses of the diseased society of pre-war Europe, which made the appalling cataclysm of 1914 inevitable. Mann also wrote *Children and Fools*. But *Buddenbrooks* undoubtedly remains his best work.

Mann is only 54 years of age, of a quiet and unobtrusive personality, but, as Bruno Frank assures us, and he should know, with a smoldering undercurrent beneath the surface. Many noted writers have such an undercurrent. I noted it in [illegible] Lagerlöf, the Swedish Nobel Prize [illegible]

when *I visited her in Sweden some years ago. Mann today is the recognized leader* of German novelists Strong in characterization, with a *teinte* of irony, he has a deep sense of the tragedy of human life, an almost Dostoyevskian intuition of the abysses of the human soul, combined with deep critical judgment of the vital weaknesses of modern society

* * *

And while we are considering foreign writers let us glance for a moment at a great Hungarian writer, Miklos Surányi author of many historical novels In *The Woman of Naples* recently published by the Cosmopolitan Book Corporation of New York Surányi an outstanding literary figure of present-day Hungary, makes his first bow to the American public This historical tale of King Mathias Corvinus, one of Hungary's greatest Kings, and his moral and physical ruin at the hands of his immoral and treacherous wife, Beatrice of Aragon (scornfully called by the Hungarians the Woman of Naples'), gives a vivid picture of one of the most colorful and romantic periods of Hungarian history

It is a pity that the publishers give no information about Surányi's life and works Having been in personal contact with Surányi while in Hungary a few months ago I am able to supply the following essential facts Surányi was born some forty years ago near Pecs in Hungary and here received his early education After a brief journalistic career in Budapest he went to Marmorasziget (now Rumanian territory) as Keeper of State Documents It was here that he acquired the vast store of historical knowledge which fitted him for his future career His first novel *The Peacock of Trianon*, was a historical romance of eighteenth century Vienna Other works rapidly followed Surányi is now editor of the *Nemzeti Ujsag* of Budapest The present translation, though fairly fluent prunes somewhat excessively Surányi's rich and exuberant style One might also question the wisdom of the selection some of Surányi's other works especially *The Burner*, are both more powerful and closer to our times.

* * *

One of the striking books of the month is by another Hungarian author, Rodion Markovits, viz., *Siberian Garrison* (Horace Liveright), a gloomy but dramatic picture, evidently autobiographical, though [illegible] loosely in fictional form of the vicissitudes and mental and physical sufferings of a Hungarian officer as a war prisoner in Siberia. To appreciate its truth, one must, like this reviewer, have talked long and intimately with Hungarians, Russians, Austrians and Germans who ate out their hearts so long in the Siberian hell, penned up in prison camps behind barbed wire, starving, fever-stricken, isolated, filled with hatred of their keepers, of life, of each other Men in captivity are like that But only those who have gone through it know it

* * *

ERICH MARIA REMARQUE

Le Feu of Barbusse began the deluge of war novels, but that deluge still continues A noted recent war novel is Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front*, which has remarkable psychological and dramatic quality Other recent works include *Bourru, Soldier of France*, by Jean des Vignes Rouges (Dutton), *The Wet Flanders Field* by Henry Williamson (Dutton), *Schlump The Story of a German Soldier* (Harcourt, Brace & Co) *Zero Hour*, by George Grabenhorst (Little, Brown & Co)

* * *

Still another war novel is Mary Lee's colossal work *It's a Great War* (Houghton Mifflin Company) This work, be it said, was one of the two prize winners in this company's war novel contest In the space of fully 250,000 words, Miss Lee has recorded with almost photographic minuteness her war experiences while serving in hospital and canteen "over there" Unmistakably sincere in its obvious intention to re-echo what Leonid Andreyev so suggestively called the "Red Laughter," viz., the tragic irony of war and mass slaughter, this work often lapses into uninspiring dullness in its inordinate length and meticulous detail, and lacks some vital breath of creative imagination and synthetic interpretation Can any woman write a great war novel? The answer to this query might be found in *The Long Roll*

* * *

The modern woman novelist, admits Virginia Woolf, in her brilliant essay, *A Room of One's Own* (Harcourt, Brace &

[illegible]re You Afraid to Face the Truth About Yourself?

THERE are occasions in the life of every man when he realizes how miserably he has fallen [b]elow what others had expected of him and what [h]e had dreamed for himself. The "big" man faces [t]he truth, and does something about it. The [']little" man finds an excuse for his failure, and [d]oes nothing. What are YOUR answers when you [as]k yourself questions like these:

[A]m I not drifting along aimlessly?

[W]hat, after all, is my purpose in life?

[O]nce I had real ambitions—are they unattainable?

[A]m I trusting too much to chance to bring me success?

[W]hat is my greatest weak point?

Is it lack of will, poor memory, mental laziness, mind-wandering or what?

Am I too old now ever to do anything worth while?

Am I "licked" by life, am I a "quitter"?

What can I do, now, to "find myself"?

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[If] you are in a "blind alley" [in] life, trying to grope your [way] out, you should find out [at o]nce what Pelmanism has [alrea]dy done for over 700,000 [peopl]e.

[Pelm]anism awakens the unsuspected [power]s in you. It is a scientific sys[tem of] mind training. It takes the [est]ablished principles of psy[cholog]y, simplifies them so that they [can b]e understood by everybody, and [weave]s them into a really remark[able s]ystem, which is designed to re[awake]n and to train certain mental [facul]ties which in most of us lie [almost] dormant and atrophied.

[W]hat It Has Done

[Pelmanism] originated in Great Brit[ain. Members] of the royal family, [statesmen], distinguished mili[tary and naval] officers, world-famous [writers], actors, editors and [leaders] in industry and [people] of the higher distinc[tion] [illegible]—became just as [illegible] as clerks and [illegible] day-laborers.

[illegible] moved to America, [illegible]

people in every part of the world [illegible] and women [illegible] of the highest [type] of intelligence [illegible] Pelmanism to help them "find themselves."

The Kind of People Who Advocate Pelmanism

Is it not clear that there must be something of great value in Pelmanism when distinguished men and women like the following advise you to take it up? Hundreds of other names like these could be added if space allowed.

General Sir Robert Baden - Powell, founder of the Boy Scout Movement.

Judge Ben B. Lindsey, founder of the Juvenile Court of Denver.

Frank P. Walsh, former Chairman of National War Labor Board.

Major General Sir Frederick Maurice, Director of Military Operations, Imperial General Staff.

Admiral Lord Beresford, G. C. B., G. C. V. O.

T. P. O'Connor, "Father of the House of Commons."

H. R. H. Prince Charles of Sweden.

Jerome K. Jerome, author and dramatist.

General Sir O'Moore Creagh, V. C., G. C. B., G. C. S. I.

George Lunn, formerly Lt. Governor of State of New York.

Sir Harry Lauder, celebrated comedian.

Sir Harry Johnson, author and dramatist.

Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch, dramatist.

W. L. George, author.

A. Gillespie, Vice President of Cluett, Peabody & Co.

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Co.), is sex-conscious, and Miss Woolf sees in this a danger. *A fortiori*, the great creative mind must be bi-sexual, in other words, hermaphroditic, or androgenous. One may question the possibility of this in literary biology. Here it is allied with a very interesting consideration of why woman writers have achieved so little through the centuries, explained as due to economic subservience, masculine monopolization of intellectual freedom, and man's crushing predominance along all lines. The thesis is enticing. Granted that Leopardi's pessimistic doubt that "woman's narrow temples" can ever create anything worth creating, was either incorrect, or, in view of women's mental, moral and economic emancipation, is no longer true, what may women not achieve today (or tomorrow) as creative artists, if, as Miss Woolf stresses, they strive to rid themselves of their modern militant complexes, which, after all, are nothing more than inverted inhibitions? *Rien ne ressemble à un creux comme une bouffissure*, said the wise Sainte-Beuve.

VIRGINIA WOOLF

* * *

John Erskine's latest novel, *Sincerity* (Bobbs-Merrill Company) would undoubtedly be called in Germany *tendenzios*, for in it one may find reflected a number of the new ideas regarding both marital and extra-marital relations which have developed in comparatively recent years, and of which Bertrand Russell, the English philosopher, is perhaps the most noted exponent. There is the revolt against the monotony of monogamous marriage, and the thirst for new horizons; there is also the insistence on "the right to be happy" of which Mrs. Bertrand Russell writes so eloquently. *Sincerity* is undoubtedly Erskine's best novel, not excluding *The Private Life of Helen of Troy*, which, properly considered, was little more than an intellectual *tour de force*. This new and modern novel exposes, with extreme cleverness, and, at times, subtlety, the deceit and pretense not only of marriage but also of so-called love relation outside marriage, though, in the latter case, it is only fair to point out that Erskine shows us the other side of the medal, painting a rather ecstatic picture of moral beauty potential in a legally forbidden union. Here the thesis is exemplified by a modern couple that drift apart, and sail perilously on antinomian waters, until the wife, wearied and disillusioned by her own experiences, returns years later to take her husband away from the woman friend to whom she had relinquished him. The main motif—the need of sincerity between husband and wife—has already been exploited in a story which I read in Italy three years ago by a very clever Italian writer, who predicates from it equally cataclysmic results; but Erskine gives it a more ingenious motivation. Erskine writes with sharp and pungent irony, not only showing the tragedy, but also satirizing the comedy of some of our modern interpretations of the New Morality. Or, if you like, the order might be reversed: "it would be funny were it not so sad," as Pushkin put it in a line much quoted.

* * *

And speaking of Bertrand Russell and the New Morality, it is curious to observe that no reviewer of Russell's recent book, *Marriage and Morals* (to be further noticed in this magazine in our February issue), has pointed out all the "moral dynamite" with which this study of the New Morality is loaded. This latter-day social philosopher declares, on the whole, his belief in marriage as an institution, and in the preservation of family life. What he seeks to modify and adopt it to our changed conceptions of morality. Some of the startling ideas he advances are: Legal marriage should begin with the immediate prospect of children, not before; mutual infidelity should be permitted after physical attraction has vanished in mid-channel, provided divorce is inadvisable because of the existence of children, but the woman, in case she exercises this privilege, should guarantee her husband the legitimacy of her offspring; children should be rid of the obsessions of sex by early revelatory instruction and by familiarizing them daily in the family circle with parental and general nakedness.

Let us be scrupulously fair to a progressive social thinker who is trying, in a time of indescribable moral confusion, to increase by constructive proposals the sum of human happiness. But some of this "moral dynamite," especially that applied to the moral education of children, might, in effect, prove to be exactly that, and

might well do incalculable psychological and psychical damage. Russell and his school, be it noted, are not only preaching these doctrines, they are actually putting some of them into practice

* * *

To turn again to the American scene, there is no exaggeration in saying that *Our Singing Strength* (Coward, McCann), Alfred Kreymborg's anthology of American poetry from the early beginnings to the present day, is a remarkable achievement The text is exceedingly well written, and is copiously illustrated by well-chosen quotations Much that the author says is challenging and thought-provoking, and his literary judgments are, in general, sound and at times illuminating Some of the greatest names in American literature are here represented—Emerson, Whittier, Lanier, Poe, Lowell Whitman So, too, latter-day singers Edward Arlington Robinson, Robert Frost, Conrad Aiken, Vachel Lindsey and many others One of the most interesting chapters deals with Robinson Jeffers, contrasted, as symbolic of a new age with Whitman Kreymborg takes the Whitman age stemming from Emerson, as representative of the virtues of the race the Jeffers period as representative of its vices One should not fail, however, to point out here that Jeffers has recently published a new work, *Dear Judas and Other Poems* (Horace Liveright), which is in effect a Passion Play in the biblical sense, and shows an entirely new orientation Kreymborg's anthology, which bulks over 600 pages, is a book which will richly repay careful and repeated reading It takes its title from Robert Frost's poem of the same name, in which occur the lines

Well, something for a snow storm to have shown,
The country's singing strength thus brought together

* * *

There are a number of other noteworthy recent books which can be only briefly mentioned here Harry Elmer Barnes's tremendous and devastating attack on Christianity, *The Twilight of Christianity* (Vanguard Press), and C. Hartley Grattan's volume descriptive of the causes that led the United States to enter the World War, *Why We Fought* (Knopf), are both reserved for special reviews in a later issue of this magazine . . . In *Grandmother Brown's Hundred Years* (Little, Brown & Co), which won the Atlantic Monthly Biography Prize of $5,000, we read, in a work which has considerable historical value, the quaint and intimate record of a true American Pioneer Mother. . . . *The Life and Letters of Joseph Pennell,* by Elizabeth Robins Pennell (Little, Brown & Co.), is an interesting biography, written by a loving wife, of an illustrious American artist who, in his atrabilious moments, was one of America's bitterest critics . And *à propos* of critics of America, Count Keyserling, in his recent book, *America Set Free* (Harper & Bros), goes almost further than Pennell in his mordant strictures on the defects of American civilization as this foreign philosopher sees them Pennell, though he lived much in London, had at least the justification of being an American Whatever one may say of him, one may seriously question whether Keyserling is mentally capable of seeing American civilization steadily, and seeing it whole Another critic of America, but a more sympathetic and perspicacious one, Bernard Fay, has shown in his recent volume *Dr Franklin, The Apostle of Modern Times* (Little, Brown & Co), that he is remarkably well equipped to understand, and properly to appreciate, one of the greatest men in our national history. . Lyle Saxon's delightful volume, *Old Louisiana* (The Century Company), is noteworthy in its skillful distillation of *le parfum du passé*, its re-creation of a world now long dead which those of Southern birth or blood still cherish and regret . . *King's Pleasure* by Ida Zeitlin, with illustrations by the Russian artist, Nadejen (Harper & Bros), revives in an English strongly flavored by medieval archaisms, the fascinating legends of the Serbs The book is beautifully illustrated in color.

Adventures of an Illustrator (Little, Brown)

JOSEPH PENNELL

* * *

We note that Harper & Bros. are preparing to launch a series of scholarly works on European history in twenty illustrated volumes, under the editorship of Professor William Langer of Harvard. That the Modern Library has just published a complete edition of Sudermann's *Song of Songs;* also *An Anthology of American Negro Literature,* edited by V. F. Calverton. . . . That the miscellaneous writings of that famous lover,

Casanova, withheld from the world for over a century and showing him, contrary to his usual reputation, to have been a man of considerable versatility and intellectual attainments in many fields of knowledge, are to be published both in Europe and America, and that Covici-Friede, the New York publishers, have acquired the American rights of publication. . . . That the Roehrich Museum Press of New York has begun publication of its New Era Library with three volumes: *American Artists*, by Ivan Narodny; *Heart of Asia*, by Roehrich, and *Flame in Chalice*, a selection of Roehrich's poems, translated from the Russian by Mary Siegrist. Other works on art, science, biography will follow.

FRANCIS SNOW.

George Harvey's Influence in Politics

By WILLIAM MacDONALD
HISTORIAN AND PUBLICIST

GEORGE HARVEY: "A PASSIONATE PATRIOT." By Willis Fletcher Johnson. With an introduction by Calvin Coolidge. 436 pages. Houghton, Mifflin Company. $5.

GIVEN a personality to which the much-overworked adjective "colorful" applies with peculiar force, and whose activities included events of which the whole world took notice, and we have a subject about which no biographer can be expected to say the final word. Mr. Johnson's biography of George Harvey, a brilliant piece of work as far as scope and literary effectiveness go, is likely to call out a good deal of criticism from students of American history no matter how much praise they may feel compelled to bestow upon it.

GEORGE HARVEY

Harvey, in many ways, was unique. He was able, energetic, vivid, masterful, a born politician, an adept in intrigue, ... as a rule fully aware of what he was doing and of the position which he occupied. Mr. Johnson, apparently, has ...

himself to fall so deeply in love with his subject as to make his book very much the kind of biography that Harvey himself would have desired. The book is lively, informing, immensely entertaining, and combative, but it is not inerrant, and the thoughtful reader is pretty certain to wonder occasionally if Mr Johnson is interested in the whole story

Harvey's life, on the other hand, was itself far from a whole story He was first and always a partisan, living for causes and throwing himself with prodigious energy and zest into advocacy or opposition as interest moved him Like Bryan he was at once a weighty influence behind the scenes and a persistent advertiser of himself before the footlights There is high authority for holding that all greatness is born of ambition, and that if the ambition be a noble one none should blame it but the nobility of Harvey's ambition had an ineradicable partisan tinge, and the historian will be prone to suspect that what he claimed for himself was sometimes more than the part he actually played

The whole of Mr Johnson's book is worth reading, and there is not a dull page in it. Busy readers, however will be likely to seek out the parts that deal with certain important moments of Harvey's career Harvey's prominence as a journalist began with his purchase of the *North American Review*, in 1899 and his transformation of that monthly into a personal organ "instinct with his own personality hen the old firm of Harper & Bros into financial difficulties he became head of the reorganized house, directing the publication of books, supervising editing of *Harper's Magazine* and becoming himself the editor of *Harper's Weekly*. He never abandoned his journalistic interest and point of view, and it as a journalist that he made his entrance into the council chambers and corridors of politics

Mr. Johnson gives a lively and detailed account of Harvey's "discovery" of Woodrow Wilson and of his part in grooming Wilson for the Presidency by way of the Governorship of New Jersey. One gathers that Harvey's influence was well-nigh all-important in the election of Wilson as Governor, and that his part in securing Wilson the first Presidential nomination was considerable On the question of who first suggested Wilson for the Presidency Mr. Johnson is clear that Harvey's Lotus Club speech in New York, in 1906, must be regarded as the actual beginning of Wilson's Presidential campaign."

The air of mystery that hangs about the relations between Wilson and Harvey

is not wholly dispelled by Mr. Johnson's narrative. In 1910, Wilson was "affable and unconventional"; in 1911, "stately and austere." The change of manner did not prevent Harvey from championing Wilson as a Presidential candidate in 1911 in the columns of *Harper's Weekly*, and the famous incident at the Manhattan Club, New York, when Wilson practically asked Harvey to "stop advocating" his nomination because of "cheap talk" to the effect that Harvey was speaking for "the interests," was used by Henry Watterson and not by Harvey to injure the Wilson cause. Before the end of the year Wilson, in a letter which Mr. Johnson gives, recalled the incident and asked Harvey to "forgive me, and forget my manners."

It is difficult to follow Mr. Johnson in his contention that Harvey implanted in Wilson's mind the germ of a League of Nations idea. According to Mr. Johnson, Harvey, after spending the evening of Oct. 4, 1914, at the White House, said to Wilson "sententiously" on leaving that the war would afford to Wilson an opportunity for a higher fame than Washington because "you, sir, may become the Father of the Peace of the World." Ten years later Dr. Axson, Wilson's brother-in-law, declared that Wilson, "a little while after this call," spoke to him of four things that would have to be settled after the war, the last thing "that all nations must be absorbed into some great association of nations, whereby all shall guarantee the integrity of each." Dr. Johnson thinks "we may reasonably surmise" that the idea was due to Harvey, notwithstanding that in the absence of other evidence it is equally reasonable to surmise exactly the reverse.

Whatever Harvey's interest in a League of Nations may have been, he was on the other side later in the Harding campaign. Mr. Johnson quotes Harvey as saying that Harding was nominated "because there was nothing against him, and because the delegates wanted to go home," but he filled the columns of *Harper's Weekly* with attacks upon the League in the form in which the Peace Conference had planned it. Mr. Coolidge's nomination as Vice President was regarded by Harvey with "profound satisfaction," but [illegible] memorandum of a conversation [illegible] the two men later, on the eve [illegible] departure from Washington to attend Harding's funeral, Mr. Coolidge is [illegible] resented as amazingly uninformed regarding all of the important questions [illegible] which as President he would have [illegible]. The memorandum [illegible] with a letter, written [illegible]

terview in question, in which Harvey praises Coolidge to the skies.

Harvey's career is a striking illustration of the prominence which a man who probably could not have been elected to any important office anywhere may nevertheless attain. He was a picturesque Ambassador to Great Britain, served as a member of the Supreme Council and of various conferences which wrestled with the problems of political settlement after the war, and was active in preparing the way for the settlement of the war debts. Mr. Johnson ranks him next to Secretary of State Hughes in the preparations for the Washington Conference because to him fell the task of dealing directly with Great Britain, the power "which regarded itself as having a paramount interest" in naval limitation. On these and other subjects, as well as about personal interests and friendships, Mr. Johnson offers a wealth of information which makes his book, for the time being at least, indispensable.

Daniel Webster as Hero

By DAVID S. MUZZEY

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

DANIEL WEBSTER. By Allan L. Benson. New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation. 1929. Pp. viii, 402. $5.

THIS book would never have been written had it not been for an admiration for the character of Webster that was conceived by the author when, fifty years ago, he was a small boy in a country school in the Middle West" (p. 188). The admiration of the schoolboy, doubtless stimulated by pious extracts from Webster's orations in McGuffey's Readers, has not waned in half century. Mr. Benson's book is a frank piece of hero-worship, though tempered by a palliated acknowledgment of some minor shortcomings in his hero. The results of Mr. Benson's enthusiasm are apparent in the very engaging qualities of

DANIEL WEBSTER

the biography—glowing approval of Webster's policies, generous sympathy with his perplexities, unbounded admiration for his genius, all presented with a vividness and persuasiveness which characterize a labor of love.

The more critical student of American history, however, while appreciating the charm of Mr. Benson's book, will not be able to accept it without grave objections. He will find that the author at times attributes to Webster an influence upon the course of our politics which is hardly justified by the documentary evidence; that he sometimes puts an interpretation upon Webster's public utterances which is not consistent either with the actual facts or with Webster's own words; that he attributes to Webster's undeviating devotion to principles behavior which is clearly the counsel of expediency; that he draws inferences as to the results of some of the most important of Webster's actions from a presentation of the case which either ignores or touches only lightly upon the most pertinent factors. It would require many columns of this magazine to examine these instances in detail, but a few of the more important ones may be note

Mr. Benson insists that Webster, obedience to principles formed early a never departed from, took the same vi of the slavery question that Lincoln after him, and that if any fault is fou with Webster for his speech on the Co

mise of 1850, the same criticism must ly to the great Emancipator. "Lincoln a position with regard to the problem ented by slavery that was identical that of Webster" (p. vi, 358), and . Lodge, who censured Webster be- e he was "fair game," did not dare to cize Lincoln (p. 354). Now it is true Lincoln agreed with Webster that the ive slave law should not be violated that the Federal Government could nterfere with slavery in the States it was legally established But on ain point of the Compromise of 1850 hich Mr. Benson alludes only casu- n elaborating his points of agree- , namely, the question as to whether y should be barred from the new ory, Lincoln's position was exactly posite of Webster's Webster would o law on that subject which might ffense to the slaveholder, Lincoln adamant on the refusal to allow entrance into the territories of the

n, Mr. Benson is indignant that any ould have accused Webster of in- ency in the position he took in the 7th of March speech Leaving e question as to whether or not it pedient or wise for Webster to op-

Continued on Page 819

Pictures in Rotogravure

Associated Press

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, LONDON

Where the London Conference on Naval Disarmament meets on Jan 21. The scene of many peace conclaves, St. James's was chosen for all meetings of the five-power conference except the first. It was built from Holbein designs in 1532 and thereafter housed the British kings up to George IV

Harris & Ewing

SECRETARY OF STATE
HENRY L. STIMSON
Head of the delegation announced by the President on Nov. 20

Associated Press

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS
Secretary of the Navy, who follows the precedent of his two illustrious ancestors, John Adams and Charles Francis Adams, both of whom represented this country in London

Harris & Ewing

JOSEPH T. ROBINSON
Senator from Arkansas and Democratic member of the delegation

Harris & Ewing

DAVID A. REED
Republican Senator from Pennsylvania

—AT THE LONDON CONFERENCE

Times Wide World

HUGH S GIBSON

Ambassador to Belgium and Chairman of the 1927 Disarmament Conference

Harris & Ewing

CHARLES GATES DAWES

Our Ambassador to Great Britain, whose preliminary conversations with Prime Minister MacDonald During the Summer of 1929 prepared the way for a Conference

Associated Press

DWIGHT W MORROW

United States envoy to Mexico, formerly a partner of J P Morgan

COMMEMORATING THE FASCIST—

Associated Press

PREMIER MUSSOLINI

Reviewing the Fascist army which, on the seventh anniversary, re-enacted the march on Rome of 1922

Keystone View

BEFORE THE VICTOR EMMANUEL MONUMENT

[illegible]thering of thousands of loyal Fascists to hear Mussolini sum up the achievements of the seven-year Fascist régime

Associated Press

LEADERS IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY

At the celebration of the twelfth anniversary of the Bolshevist Revolution of 1917 were Joseph Stalin, Secretary General of the Russian Communist Party; Bukharin, chief literary exponent of Communist doctrine; G. K. Ordjonikdze, Commissar for Peasants' and Workers' Inspection, and J. E. Rudzutak, Commissar for Transportation

Associated Press

RED SQUARE, MOSCOW

Decked with banners and thronged with Red soldiers during the recent ceremonies in honor of the Revolution

GATHERING OF THE NATIONS OF THE PACIFIC

Times Wide World

THE CONFERENCE OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

This meeting, the third of its kind, was held at Kyoto, Japan, from Oct. 28 to Nov. 9. Distinguished unofficial representatives from Japan, United States, China, Canada, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand discussed a number of pressing international problems

THE NEW MINISTER TO CHINA

Harris & Ewing.

NELSON T. JOHNSON

Mr. Johnson, before his recent appointment to succeed John V. A. MacMurray as United States Minister to China, was Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department.

VETERANS OF SENATE AND PARLIAMENT

Associated Press

THOMAS POWER ("T. P.") O'CONNOR

His death on Nov. 18, 1929, at the age of 81, ended a career of forty-nine years in the House of Commons and sixty-two years in journalism. In Parliament he was one of the leaders of the Irish Nationalist Party and in journalism the editor of T. P.'s Weekly.

Harris & Ewing

SENATOR FRANCIS E. WARREN

Who represented Wyoming in the Senate for nearly 37 years. The longest term on record in American history was ended by his death on Nov. 24 at the age of 85. Senator Warren distinguished himself chiefly as Chairman of the Appropriations Committee.

DEATH OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Harris & Ewing

JAMES W. GOOD

A close friend of the President, his Western campaign manager in 1928, and finally a member of the Hoover Cabinet, Mr. Good ended his long and varied political life on Nov. 18 at the age of 63

NEW REGIMES IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

Times Wide World

JAMES SCULLIN

Who became Prime Minister of Australia when the Labor party was returned to power in the October elections

Times Wide World

LORD BLEDISLOE, formerly Sir Charles Bathurst, British agricultural expert, who was appointed Governor General of New Zealand on Nov. [illegible] to succeed General Sir Charles Ferguson

WAR DEAD OF THE A. E. F. IN RUSSIA

Times Wide World

BODIES OF 75 AMERICAN SOLDIERS COME HOME

American victims of the Archangel expedition in 1918 and 1919. After the armistice they were sent into Northern Russia under British command

THE NEW BRITISH AMBASSADOR

Associated Press

SIR RONALD LINDSAY

His appointment to succeed Sir Esmé Howard at Washington was announced on Nov. 12. He has twice been attached to the British Embassy in Washington, during the Roosevelt and Wilson administrations, and at the time of his appointment was permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and chief of the Foreign Office in London

VOL. XXXI. NO. 4 JANUARY, 1930

Current HISTORY

The League of Nations and the United States

The tenth anniversary of the League of Nations, which will be celebrated this month, again directs attention to the attitude of the United States. In the following articles, America's abstention is discussed. Mr. Kaltenborn urges that, in view of the changed character of the League, America owes it to itself to join. Further arguments for joining are advanced by ex-Supreme Court Justice Clarke. In opposition to our joining, ex-Ambassador David Jayne Hill contends that the original reasons why the United States remained aloof are still valid. Professor Brown, in his contribution, claims that our joining would entangle us in the politics of Europe.

In Favor of Joining the League

I.

By H. V. KALTENBORN
ASSOCIATE EDITOR, *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*

A GROUP OF AMERICANS in Geneva sitting on the Hotel Bergues balcony overlooking the lovely lake in September, 1929, were debating the probable date when the United States would become a member of the League of Nations. No one was inclined to name the exact year, yet this being an American occasion, a wager was offered, and so discussion centred about dates. It was finally agreed that 1935 was the year in which the party would meet again to celebrate America's entry at the expense of the only member of the group who was

willing to wager that it would take more than six years.

Among those League enthusiasts who have followed with eager interest the developments at Geneva during the first decade of the League's existence there is little doubt that the United States will ultimately become a member. Each year the League has grown stronger, more firmly rooted, more popular, more useful. Each year also the United States has coöperated in League work more willingly, more largely, and more effectively.

NON-MEMBER POWERS

Russia and the United States are the only important non-member powers, and they have both been glad to join in every League activity which affected their interests. Russia has found the Geneva meetings of the Disarmament Commission a most convenient means of proclaiming to the world the peaceful intentions of a Communist Government. The United States has sent powerful delegations to Geneva not only to advance American views but to prevent the opposing views of other governments from dominating international meetings.

To understand the present power and prestige of the Geneva organization it is necessary to realize the great change it has undergone since 1919. It was conceived as a means of preventing war. It has developed into a vast complex of international machinery for the promotion of peace. While it has functioned successfully to prevent minor international conflicts, intervention of this kind has been rare and incidental. The League's dominant and all-absorbing task is to remove the causes of war and to further all coöperative action that promotes peace. The League has proceeded on the assumption that whatever makes for the well-being of humanity, promotes [illegible], reduces poverty, eases com[illegible]ications, facilitates contacts, fur[illegible] understanding, eliminates fric[illegible], contributes directly to the peace [illegible] world. To prevent war is, in a [illegible] the negative side of the League's work. Nor is there any certainty that the League can, in any particular instance, prevent war any more than the anti-war pact could prevent it. But day in and day out, year in and year out, the League can and does promote peace. If the United States had rightly understood the relative importance of these two League undertakings, if we had appreciated the utter absence of any super-state authority to issue an anti-war fiat backed by the threat of force, our relations with the Geneva organization might have developed differently.

Politically the League is still weak and will remain so for a good many years to come. Strong nations are still unwilling to yield to it any considerable fraction of their national power. They believe in the League, they applaud it, they cooperate in its many undertakings, but they do not rely on it to promote their national interests. With smaller countries the case is different. They see in the League an instrument of power with which to offset their own weakness. They want to rely upon the League because they are unable to rely upon themselves. In controversies with a larger power they need League help. Their enthusiasm and their support have given the League much of its vitality. Thanks largely to their constant pressure the League long ago ceased to be an organization to consolidate the allied victory and crystallize the map of the world on the basis of the 1919 treaties. Already in 1929 the League Assembly was reminded by the Chinese delegate that it is one of the functions of the League under the covenant to inquire into any treaties which create ill-feeling between nations and thus endanger peace. He referred to Article XIX which reads as follows: "The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."

There was little reference to this article during the first decade of the

League's existence. Now that the League is gradually acquiring power there will be constant efforts on the part of weaker countries to use League strength to their own advantage. Each year sees the smaller powers enlarging their authority and influence within the League. From the first they have played the most prominent part in the work of the Assembly and, thanks to the enlargement of the Council, they have become much more important in the work of that body. The great powers still exercise the preponderant influence. A hint of opposition from the delegate of France will carry great weight with the delegates of a dozen small countries. Yet each passing year sees delegates in both Council and Assembly speaking out more boldly when it is a question of defending League policy against national interest.

When the League began its work it had forty-two members. Today there are fifty-four. In returning to the League in 1929 both Peru and Bolivia expressed through their delegates high appreciation of the League's contribution to the settlement of international difficulties in which they were involved. Peru returned "because she had become convinced of the moral authority of the League Assembly" and because the happy outcome of her long-standing dispute with Chile was due "to the generous intervention of the American Government and more especially to the atmosphere of peace and cooperation fostered by the League of Nations." The Bolivian delegate, recalling the League's intervention in the frontier dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay in January, 1929, assured the Assembly that his country felt "a warm feeling of confidence in the League on that occasion."

The United States remained out of the League because it feared an alliance with war-making Europe. Americans did not propose to sign a covenant which seemed to perpetuate wartime obligations. America's decisive vote against the League in 1922 expressed our determination to avoid any obligation to enforce peace in other parts of the world. The "war against war" having proved an illusion, we did not propose "to be fooled again" by being drawn into a visionary "League against war." It was America's disgust with the secret treaties, with war lies, with the vindictive character of the peace that made us shun a League which grew out of these events and which was born as an integral part of a peace whose terms denied our most important war aims.

As the League has grown in prestige and authority, hostility to it has diminished. Germany's admission to the Council and Assembly in 1926 eliminated the argument that it was a League of victor nations formed to conserve and guarantee the spoils of war. The influence of France and Britain became less pervasive. The smaller powers began to find in Geneva a valuable forum for the exposition of their views and a powerful agency for the protection of their interests.

The first three Assemblies were devoted exclusively to organization and to aiding post-war reconstruction. Most of the League work of this period, repatriation of war prisoners, refugee settlement, the financial reconstruction of Austria and Hungary, was accomplished by the Council and various commissions. Members of the Assembly were extremely timid about expressing any views which might not meet the approval of the Big Four (Britain, France, Italy, Japan) whose representatives dominated the Council.

Struggle Over Council Membership

Because of the large importance attributed to Council membership the struggle for seats on that body became intense. When Germany joined the League in 1926 it became necessary to enlarge Council membership to satisfy the demands of lesser powers. The original nine seats were increased to fourteen. "Semi-permanent" seats were added to the "permanent" and "temporary" seats in a vain effort to prevent Spain and Brazil from resigning.

The original aim of the great powers

was to keep constant control of the Council by allotting the five permanent seats to themselves and granting four non-permanent seats to the rest of the world. America's absence and the necessity of assigning Germany a permanent seat upset this arrangement. Once the doors were open to change, Poland, Brazil, Spain and China presented weighty claims to a preferred position. The League experienced the bitterest struggle of its history in the rivalry of these national claims. It was finally agreed to make room for every one by adding six new members to the original nine, but this unsatisfactory solution came too late to prevent Spain and Brazil from leaving in a huff. Both have since repented and returned to the fold, but an unwieldy Council and an unedifying annual struggle among Assembly members for Council seats are the unhappy result of their intransigeance.

Council Membership Problem

The problem of Council membership has not reached its final solution. Both the United States and Russia are entitled to permanent seats. China, representing more people than any three other powers, excepting India, will soon insist on recognition equal to Japan's. The creation of "semi-permanent" seats raised more difficulties than it solved. A truly democratic League would eliminate all distinctions among Council seats, but it will be many years before the great powers acknowledge the doctrine of equal sovereignty to any such extent. The League of sovereign nations is still far from becoming a League of equal nations.

Meanwhile there is a disposition among the smaller powers to seek more authority for the Assembly, in which they have equal and permanent representation. In 1929 Premier Stauning of Denmark said to his Assembly colleagues: "The struggles to obtain seats on the Council have become one of the least satisfactory features of the League. Could not these difficulties be overcome by endowing the Assembly with a more active share in the work?" He went on to complain that the States which are members of the Council dominate the membership of all important commissions. To remedy this he proposed that commissions be appointed jointly by Council and Assembly rather than by the Council acting alone.

Until recently the Assembly was not even scheduled to meet regularly each year. No one knew what the delegates of fifty nations would or could do when they met together. But the opportunity to make their voices heard made such an appeal to the small nations that the annual September meeting of the Assembly was soon taken for granted. Minor powers began sending their Premiers and Foreign Ministers to the Assembly as delegates, with the result that the major powers felt obligated to do likewise. Today, all over the world, statesmen are planning the year round what they are going to say and do on that important annual occasion in Geneva when they are sure of a world-wide audience.

No nation has had more to do with the creation of the League than the United States, and few have had more to do with its development. The memorial stone fronting the Lake of Geneva which uses large letters to describe Woodrow Wilson as the founder of the League of Nations, and small ones to recall that he was also President of the United States, probably anticipates the verdict of history on his outstanding achievements. Many Americans before Woodrow Wilson dreamed of a league, but dreamers rarely occupy positions of power. In Woodrow Wilson a dreamer became head of the world's most powerful national unit. By sacrificing many possible achievements in Paris in 1919, he made a dream come true. He lived to convoke the first sessions of the League's Council and Assembly, but failed to persuade the United States Senate to accept membership on his conditions.

A decade of League experience shows us that Wilson's dispute with the Senate concerned issues which were and

H. V. KALTENBORN

are largely academic. The League reservations, if accepted, would not have prevented our full cooperation in any League activity. Subsequent interpretations of Article X show that this guarantee of the political independence and territorial integrity of all League members is not "the heart of the covenant." Other countries have also reserved the right to decide for themselves when, and how, and whether they will participate in the enforcement of this article of the covenant.

U. S. PARTICIPATION INCREASING

Because of this political quarrel and its consequences, succeeding Republican administrations have felt bound to show a certain hostility to the League and all its works. In 1921 the State Department still ignored League communications, and it was not until 1923 that our government consented to have American officials participate in League meetings in an unofficial capacity. By 1925 we became bold enough to participate officially in two League conferences, one dealing with the traffic in arms, the other on the opium traffic. In the first we participated because our own interests were seriously involved. We joined the second under pressure from socially minded Americans.

By 1927 our hostility and apprehensions abated sufficiently for us to participate with fully accredited official representatives in four important international conferences summoned by the Council of the League. At the Economic Conference, the Transit and Communications Conference, the Import and Export Conference and on the Preparatory Disarmament Commission the United States had unusually strong delegations. The State Department was wise enough to recognize that when issues vital to the business and political life of the United States are being discussed by the leading nations of the world, our interests require that we be represented by competent delegates concerning whose prestige and authority there can be no question.

FAILURE TO USE FACILITIES

It is unfortunate that President Coolidge's first attempt to make even more direct use of League facilities ended in failure. The poorly prepared three-power naval conference of 1927 was held in the Secretariat of the League in Geneva. It is safe to say that if the League Secretariat rather than our State Department had prepared that meeting, the groundwork would have been laid with more care, and a larger measure of success might have been achieved.

Several times each year the United States is now officially represented at League conferences. The official American delegates "with power only to observe" have given way to delegates who have the same powers as those from other countries. The experts appointed by the State Department "without authority to speak for the Government" now speak for the Government to excellent effect. Nor is it possible nowadays to draw that clear-cut line between political and non-political subjects which Secretary of State Hughes had in mind during his term of office.

In justifying our cooperation with the League before the Republican State

Convention of 1924, Hughes declared that such cooperation was safe and proper because "we do not take up subjects which involve political entanglements." But if economic conferences on tariff walls, discussions on arms traffic and arms limitation, conferences on import and export restrictions and on double taxation and tax evasion do not involve political issues, what does? And how is a League member more "entangled" by official participation in these conferences than a non-League member? Only the astute legal mind can discover and define such distinctions. On the basis of plain fact and common sense they do not exist.

The Republican platform of 1928 states the case somewhat differently. "We have most usefully assisted," this platform declares, "in the humanitarian and technical work undertaken by the League, without involving ourselves in European politics by accepting membership." Yet such matters as disarmament cannot, by any stretch of terminology, be considered as exclusively "humanitarian and technical." The reduction of a country's army and navy is a matter of vital political importance. Governments are made and unmade on this one issue. It involves vital questions of home policy and foreign relations. Present and prospective political relations (entanglements) are fundamental in all discussions of disarmament.

PRESIDENT HARDING'S POLICY

It will be remembered that President Harding and the vast majority of voters who supported him were willing to have us join an "Association of Nations." Just how this was to differ from the League has never been explained. In a sense we have now joined such an "Association" through promoting and signing the a.ti-war pact. At the Interparliamentary Conference held at Geneva in September, 1929, the American delegates quoted both President Hoover and Senator Borah, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to the general effect that the United States would not be indifferent to a violation of this pact.

Many qualified students of international relations see little difference between "involving ourselves in European politics by accepting membership" in the League of Nations and involving ourselves in European politics by joining with the nations of the world in an anti-war pact to the violation of which we cannot be indifferent.

ATTITUDE OF PRESIDENT HOOVER

In his inaugural message President Hoover based our continued absence from the council board of the League on thoroughly unselfish grounds. He said: "Our people has determined that we should make no political engagement such as membership in the League of Nations. They adhere to the belief that the independence of America from such obligations increases its ability and availability for service in all fields of human progress."

Let us note in the first place that Herbert Hoover does not say that *he* has "determined" or that *he* "adheres to the belief." There is good ground for believing, on the basis of his record, and remembering some of his earlier statements about the League, that he would be willing now as then to have the United States accept membership under appropriate conditions. But he believes that public opinion still opposes our signing the covenant, and he evidently has no desire to combat public opinion on this issue.

But when did the American people "determine" that we should make no "political engagement" with the League? The only election in which they may fairly be said to have "determined" anything on this particular issue was in 1920, and that, in the history of political campaign issues, is a long time ago. Yet, they spoke then by a decided majority, and they have kept in power the party which then opposed and which still opposes American membership in the League.

Since 1920 Republican opposition to the League has abated, and Democratic enthusiasm for the League has waned. Prominent Republicans no longer decry

"FOUNDER OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS"
Tablet in memory of Woodrow Wilson which was placed by the city of Geneva on the wall surrounding the garden of the League Palace

the League as a "super-state" or speak of it as "dead." Many noted Republican leaders have friendly words for the League's achievements. The 1928 Republican platform repeated the 1920 declaration about our refusal to accept membership or to assume any obligations under the covenant, but commented with satisfaction on the cooperation of the Coolidge Administration in League work: "In accordance with the long-established American practice of giving aid and assistance to other peoples, we have most usefully assisted by cooperation in the humanitarian and technical work undertaken by the League."

Coming from a Republican party platform, the League may regard this as high praise. It is particularly significant in view of the fact that the Democratic platform of 1928 makes no mention whatever of the League or of American membership therein. One might fairly conclude that, for the time being, League membership has ceased to be an issue on which there is a sharp division between our two leading political parties.

Since Germany's admission in 1926 gave the League a much broader and more truly international basis, there has been much less concern in Geneva about American adherence. During the early meetings of the Assembly there were frequent expressions of the hope that the United States, which had contributed so much to the establishment of the League and the World Court, would see its way clear to accepting membership. League leaders at banquets attended by pro-League Americans who gather at Geneva in large numbers each Summer would elicit long-continued applause by referring to the time "not far distant" when the vacant seat at the Council table would be filled.

Today there are no vacant seats at the Council table. The chairs press closely against one another to accommodate recent newcomers. Every one is more concerned about satisfying the fifty-odd League members than about the half-dozen non-members who still linger in outer darkness. League leaders are politely sarcastic rather than warmly eloquent when they refer to the United States. They know that we join League undertakings whenever it is to our interest to do so.

Occasionally, when we are not sure about getting an invitation to join a particular League conference in which

we "have or claim to have" an interest, we throw out a discreet hint. We did that in 1928 when a League committee was working out a uniform system of measuring the tonnage of ships. The dispute as to whether the Leviathan or the Berengaria was the biggest ship afloat arose because the various national measuring systems do not agree. If the League powers agreed on a uniform system, the United States would find it impossible to impose its own system on the rest of the world. When an American ship wished to enter a foreign port or pass through a foreign canal it would have to pay dues on the basis of the universal measurements. So the League Secretariat received a hint from Washington that if an invitation were forthcoming, we would be glad to send representatives to meet with the League committee.

Naturally the League responded. The Secretariat at Geneva has always been more than polite to the United States, even in that period when we were so discourteous as not even to acknowledge its frequent communications. One of the fine things about the League is that it has no sense of diplomatic prestige or amour propre. It stands on no dignity, insists on no forms, resents no slights, cherishes no resentments. In so far as it is possible for any human institution to divest itself of personality, color or emotional influence the League Secretariat has achieved that purpose. It is an efficient, noiseless, self-starting, smooth-running, non-personal machine.

Americans ought to realize that when the Republican campaign platform of 1928 declares that our cooperation with the League is "in accordance with the long-established American practice of giving aid and assistance to other peoples," it is telling less than half the truth. Let us admit frankly that when we join international conferences on the white slave traffic, on the trade in narcotics, on communications, taxation, tariffs, health matters, the traffic in arms, disarmament, we are seeking to help ourselves more than we are seeking t help others. Our pious pretense of di: interestedness may befuddle a few i norant voters at home, but it evok sarcastic smiles in every foreign cap tal. Such smug pretense comes wit particularly bad grace from the onl country which accepted the League i Paris and then, for selfish nation reasons, repudiated it at home.

League Facilities

A little of the underlying feeling i Geneva with respect to the way i which we use or ignore the facilities c the League without accepting the finar cial or political obligations of member ship cropped out in the report whic Albert Thomas, Director of the Inter national Labor Office, submitted to th twelfth session of the International La bor Conference at Geneva in 1929. H notes with satisfaction that Washing ton is becoming more polite, and com ments on "the increasing cordiality o the replies to requests for information both from the public administrative de partments and from the employers' or ganizations. A spirit of friendly in terest in the work of the office ha spread."

Yet there is disappointment at Wash ington's continued refusal to admit thi interest officially. Robe Carl White Under-Secretary of the Department o Labor, was in Geneva to attend th meetings of the eleventh session of th International Labor Conference. H was the first important official of th United States to visit the Internationa Labor Office, but the joy over his ad vent was dampened by his announce ment that he "had come only in th course of a trip to Europe, and would not be taking part, even as an observer, in the work of the organization." A prominent official of the State Department was on duty in Geneva to study the work of the League for a considerable period in 1929, yet newspaper men who met him were requested to keep his presence in Geneva a dark secret.

Director Thomas goes on to say: "It must be recognized that the work of the Washington office and the visits of

innumerable Americans every year have contributed little to improve the position of the organization in public opinion, and more particularly in the general opinion of workers and employers in the United States." After referring to the expanding international interests of the United States in trade and investment, he concludes with a comment which may shock Americans who see their country as the moral leader of the world: "All the energy and tenacity of the organization will be required to pave the way for closer relations with the most highly industrialized, but at the same time perhaps, despite appearances, morally the most isolated country in the world."

Yet the League welcomes our increasing practical cooperation in a hundred fields of international endeavor. One must examine a complete record of all American contacts with the League over a given period to realize at once the universality of League interests and the extent of our participation in League activities. The Geneva office of the League of Nations Association prepared such a record for the first six months of 1929. During that period there were six important international conferences, held under the auspices of the League, in which the United States Government was represented. They included sessions of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, of the Experts on the Manufacture of War Materials, a conference on Counterfeiting Currency, a meeting of the Committee on the Unification of Transport Statistics a meeting of the special jurists' committee to discuss amendments to the World Court statute to facilitate American adherence, and a meeting of the Health Committee.

In the same six months the United States Legation at Berne transmitted communications from the American Government on the organization of veterinary services, on the importation, transit and exportation of animals, on a report relating to bills of exchange and checks, on the protection of stage artists in the United States, accepting American membership in the League's aerial organization and on the codification of international law. The State Department also forwarded five international treaties for publication in the League's Treaty series and Secretary Kellogg's note proposing resumption of the negotiations for American membership in the World Court. The formal declaration of the adherence of the United States to the League's Slavery Convention was deposited with the Treaty Registration Section of the Secretariat.

When it comes to unofficial Ameri-

Wide World

GERMANY ENTERS THE LEAGUE
The momentous meeting of the Council in Geneva, at which Germany was first represented. Dr. Stresemann is sitting fifth from the left

can cooperation during this period the record is even more voluminous. Former Under-Secretary of State Robert B. Olds, Roland Boyden and two other prominent Americans participated in the meetings of the Economic Consultative Committee in May. Lucius Eastman, Chairman of the Merchants' Association of New York, took part in two meetings of the Economic Committee. Jeremiah Smith, the Boston banker who supervised the financial rehabilitation of Hungary, met with the Financial Committee in June. Charles B. Eddy reported as chairman of the Greek Refugee Settlement Commission. Professor Adams, Treasury Department expert, was appointed to the fiscal committee. Charles Evans Hughes, former Secretary of State of the United States, took his seat as one of the eleven judges of the World Court. The American Group of The Hague Court of Arbitration nominated Sir Cecil Hurst of Britain and Henri Fromageot of France to succeed deceased members of the World Court. Miss Julia Lathrop attended the April meeting of the Child Welfare Committee and the Foreign Policy Association of New York was represented at two sessions of the Permanent Opium Control Board. Officials of the United States Health Service cooperated as experts in the Sanitary Organization of Greece and on the Advisory Board of the Singapore Bureau.

In connection with the League's work in intellectual cooperation, prominent Americans attended the meeting of library experts, the Conference of Institutes for Scientific Study of International Relations, a meeting of philologists on Latin languages, meetings of the directors of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, a meeting of directors of university offices, of the International Educational Cinematographic Institute and four other international conferences.

Despite this general use of League facilities, we have made no move to pay our proper share of the League's constantly increasing expenses. The total amounts involved are, to be sure, comparatively small, but there is some feeling among our impoverished European cousins that the richest country in the world should assume its proper share of the cost of an institution from which it is deriving just as much benefit as any League member.

THE QUESTION OF CONFERENCE COSTS

It may be answered that we do pay our proportionate share of the cost of all conferences which we attend. Yet this is true only if we exempt the entire cost of preparing the conference, of supervising it and of handling all the detail work that grows out of it. The principal item of cost in the unbroken series of international conferences fathered by the League is the overhead of the League Secretariat. The League's budget totals some $5,500,000 a year, and a good part of this money is spent for the secretarial work involved in conferences. Perhaps the best comparison in the matter of League contributions is between Britain and the United States. Professor Manley O. Hudson of Harvard University estimates that from 1920 to 1929 Britain (exclusive of the British Dominions, the Irish Free State and India) has contributed $3,500,000 to League expenses. Her annual contribution is now about $500,000. During the same period the United States has contributed about $22,000.

Fortunately for American self-respect, the Rockefeller Foundation and other organizations have made generous contributions to further important social and intellectual activities of the League. Consciously or unconsciously, these American contributors have rendered their country a great service by mitigating the perfectly natural resentment at our failure to deal with this phase of our League relations in a more generous spirit.

What of the future? Are we going to drift into League membership? Are we going to keep on using League facilities without assuming League obligations? Both these courses are repugnant to the American character. We are a positive, purposeful people which prefers a defi-

nite policy of action to lazy opportunism. Nor is it consonant with American traditions that we should accept the advantages which our country is deriving from the work and influence of the League without, in return, giving the League the advantage of our support.

It needs that support far less than it did ten years ago. At that time our hostility nearly dealt it a mortal blow. The international spirit was crippled and its development was much delayed by American isolation. But it soon became apparent that our opposition to the League was a matter of politics, and not of principle. The United States began doing on its own account what the League was trying to do as the principal organ of international opinion. The inevitable logic of events has led us to a community of effort. From the reduction of naval armament under American leadership we will move on to the general reduction of armaments under League leadership. From the formal outlawry of war under the Kellogg pact we are proceeding to the elaboration of sanctions against war-makers under the auspices of the League.

The time has come for Americans who believe in the League to speak out vigorously for American membership. We owe it to our pride and to our interest to have full official representation at the great forum of international opinion in Geneva. Our voice should be heard at the meetings of the Council and the Assembly. The League was created by a great American. The time has come when a great America should be proud to play its proper part in the further development of the greatest political institution of our time.

II.

By JOHN H. CLARKE

FORMER ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT; PRESIDENT, LEAGUE OF NATIONS NON-PARTISAN ASSOCIATION

MR. KALTENBORN'S admirable summary of the growth in authority and prestige and of the achievements of the League of Nations in its first ten years and his convincing account of the steady and inevitable advance of our government toward membership in the League must start in many minds the inquiry whether this obvious approach of the United States to the League may not be, really, the advance of both toward newly developed international standards with respect to war as an institution and the means of avoiding it, rather than a pronounced concession by either to the standards maintained by the other ten years ago.

All experience serves to show that important political institutions cannot be given final form by the adoption of paper constitutions. They must grow and adapt themselves to the unanticipated conditions which develop in the realities of operation. The League of Nations has proved to be no exception to this general rule, with the result that candor requires the concession that the League is a very different institution and the covenant, though little changed in text, a very different instrument in practice today from what their authors thought ten years ago they would become. But, nevertheless, there are those who think it demonstrable that the chief agency in producing the changes in public opinion which have thus modified the League has been the League itself, that without it the important progress made, and still in the making, by the present-day peace movement would have been impossible.

Notwithstanding the fact that the covenant of the League represented the maximum of agreement upon measures designed to organize the world for permanent peace that was possible among the leading statesmen of the nations in 1919, nevertheless it recognized, and still in form recognizes, war as a legiti-

mate internationally lawful institution for the settlement of disputes between nations in at least four specified cases. But nine years later, in 1928, these same nations, all united in the Paris Pact, "to condemn resort to war for the settlement of international disputes; to renounce it as an instrument of national policy; and to agree that the settlement of all disputes of whatever nature or of whatever origin which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means."

It is interesting to trace the origins of the advance in world public opinion which made such a result as this possible in so short a time, and very certainly they will be found chiefly in the activities of the League itself.

When the covenant of the League was written the conviction was general throughout the world that the precipitating, if not the fundamental, cause of the World War was the rivalry of the great powers in armaments, and it was then, and still is, confidently believed that the indispensable condition of permanent world peace is a very great reduction of national armaments and then a strict limitation of them to a much smaller total than any reached since many years before the war. Likewise, it was then confidently believed that in the present-day state of civilization and of international morality violations of the covenant must be anticipated and provision made for maintaining and restoring peace by united military action on the part of all the member nations.

These two conditions of peace were dealt with in Articles VIII, X, XV and XVI of the covenant, and so strong was this conviction as to reduction of armaments and coercion by force that at the very first meeting of the Assembly of the League a committee was charged with the duty of submitting to the Council "in the near future" (as if it were a simple matter) a plan for the reduction of armaments and for mutual military assistance in case of need. After more than two years of more comprehensive study and investigation than the subject ever received before this committee reported a form of treaty of "mutual assistance," which was sent in September, 1923, to the governments of the member nations for their consideration and comment.

Bachrach

JOHN H. CLARKE

While this proposed form of treaty proved not to be acceptable to the governments of the nations as a solution of the problem, nevertheless it is of very great significance as evidence of the changed attitude which had even then developed within the League toward war as an institution. To illustrate: It was proposed for the first time in recorded history by responsible statesmen to declare aggressive war an international crime of which signing members must not under any circumstances be guilty, thus introducing to the world in 1923 the principle of the Paris Pact

*I refer to the treaty of Aug. 27, 1928, as "The Paris Pact" rather than "The Kellogg Treaty" because it is generally so designated outside the United States and because, having regard to the facts of its origin, it seems more modest and appropriate.

of 1928; to declare in terms that no nation should be called upon to cooperate in any military, naval or air operations outside the continent in which it is situated, thus robbing Article X of its terrors, and to urge neighboring nations to unite in regional treaties of mutual assistance to be kept within the scope of the covenant, thus pointing the way to the treaties of Locarno. Plainly, this proposed treaty shows not only a fundamentally changed attitude on the part of the leading statesmen of the world toward war as an institution, but also that this change was the result of the studies, face-to-face conferences and discussions of the representatives of many nations in the frequent meetings of the League.

If, now, the League had not been a permanent institution inspired by an indomitable purpose to secure world peace, the cold reception which this first of its efforts to put the covenant into practical operation received from the governments of the leading nations would have made an end of the post-war peace movement and the world would have returned to the old rivalries in preparation for the next war. Indeed its critics, especially in our country, widely proclaimed that, futile as it was now proved to be, the League must disintegrate and disappear.

But the members of the League, convinced as they were by the unprecedented destruction of life and property in the World War that the civilized nations must find a substitute for war or perish, refused to be discouraged or dismayed, and accepting this apparent failure of their proposed treaty of mutual assistance as a stimulating challenge they sent their ablest statesmen to the next meeting of the Assembly with instructions to do all in their power to deal successfully with the crisis. Great Britain and France for the first time sent their Prime Ministers and twelve other nations sent their Ministers for Foreign Affairs. After a week of one of the most memorable debates of recent times the whole subject was resubmitted to two committees, which reported a second form of treaty which has come to be widely known as the Geneva Protocol. In this protocol is again to be found convincing evidence of the still further rapidly changing attitude of the League toward the war system, very significantly because it was recommended to their governments by the unanimous vote of the representatives of forty-eight nations and also because several of its dominant provisions were soon after written into the treaties of Locarno and later into the Pact of Paris.

THE GENEVA PROTOCOL

The advance of this protocol upon the covenant is seen in a most emphatic renewal of the declaration that aggressive war is an international crime of which the signatory States shall in no case be guilty, and in proposing compulsory submission of all legal disputes to the World Court of Justice, and of all other disputes to arbitrators, not merely for investigation and report, as in the covenant, but for final settlement to be accepted by all concerned.

Although this Geneva Protocol was widely regarded when it appeared, and is still thought by many to be the most complete and promising program for disarmament and peace that has yet been devised, France alone of the great powers accepted it, and, under the leadership of Great Britain, it was rejected in March, 1925. This failure was obviously due to the absence of the United States and Soviet Russia from the League, and it convinced the members that it was impossible to formulate an all-inclusive single treaty providing for the reduction of armaments and mutual assistance which all the nation members would sign without the presence and cooperation, certainly, of the United States, and perhaps also of the Soviet Union. The only alternative to such a general treaty of mutual assistance was believed to be regional treaties in terms similar to the general treaties which had been proposed and rejected, in which nations immediately interested in maintaining peace in limited areas might be induced to join. It was to such a treaty that the leading members of

the League next turned in the hope of avoiding another world war, with, as a result, the Locarno treaties, which much of the world believes will render war impossible in the whole of that Western Europe in which most of the great wars of modern times have originated.

The dominating and unprecedented provisions of these Locarno treaties are that France, Germany and Belgium mutually undertake and agree "that they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other," but that all disputes of every character which may arise between them in the future shall be settled by pacific means in the manner provided for therein. The peaceful processes for settlement thus provided for are reference of all disputes of a legal nature to arbitrators or to the World Court of Justice, and of all other differences to a permanent conciliation commission, to arbitration or to the Council of the League of Nations, not for a mere report and recommendation as in the covenant, but for final decision. One of the most significant provisions of these treaties is that they shall enter into force as soon as Germany has become a member of the League of Nations.

Very certainly these Locarno treaties are much more all-inclusive, compulsory agreements to settle international differences by pacific processes than were ever before entered into by powerful nations capable of waging serious foreign war. They are such an advance over any that went before that they make the pre-war arbitration treaties of our own and other nations, with their reservations of "all questions of vital interest or national honor," seem the work of medieval statesmen dealing with an antique international world which has forever passed away.

But what shall be said of the relation of the League of Nations to these treaties of Locarno and to the program for organizing the world for peace upon them as a model? Very certainly this relation may best be compared to that of parent to child. While they were not formulated by the League, nevertheless all of the signatory powers which framed them, save Germany, were members of the League, and Germany, fulfilling a condition of them, became a member in September, 1926. They

HOME OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

[On] the rim of a broad lake, with snow-capped peaks in the background, Geneva is a city of great beauty

would have been impossible without the new conception of international relations and obligations created throughout the world by the many League conferences and discussions during the five years preceding their formulation, and by their express terms so many duties and such large powers for carrying them into effect are given to the League that the treaties would be wholly incomplete and unworkable without it. In substance always, and in large part in form, they are derived from the Geneva Protocol and are essentially a League creation.

THE PACT OF PARIS

Likewise, it is strictly accurate to say that the Paris Pact is the result of the changed public opinion throughout the world created by the League of Nations. Its essential provisions, derived almost literally from the Locarno treaties and accepted by Secretary Kellogg, were formulated by M. Briand, a vice president of the League at the time and its most devoted supporter ever since its organization. And to this it must be added that all its signatories of any consequence, save only the United States, the Soviet Union and Mexico, are members of the League. While this Paris Pact is not as comprehensive as the treaties of Locarno and must depend largely for its practical value upon supplemental bilateral and other arbitration treaties and understandings, it is of profound significance to the world, because it brings our own United States for the first time within the scope of the present-day peace movement, from which for nine years it had held aloof. Palpably, the needed "implementing" (as President Hoover might say) of this treaty can be done effectively only by further agreements with the other signatory nations. How can this be accomplished more promptly and efficiently than by cooperating with the League, in which all of any consequence are already united in formulae which, if applied, would give the pact a force and effect which a merely naked paper declaration can never have? The Geneva Protocol and the Locarno treaties furnish the model.

If, now, with this cursory glance at the activities of the League of Nations in mind, the permissive resort to war, the optional jurisdiction of the World Court of Justice, and the chiefly advisory powers of the Council and Assembly provided for in the covenant be contrasted with the denunciation of resort to war as a crime and the compulsory resort to the court or to arbitration or to the Council of the League for the final settlement of all disputes, followed by the uniting of the most influential members of the League in the Locarno treaties, and of all of them in the Paris Pact, it must be apparent that the League, in practice, has become a very different institution and the covenant a very different instrument from what even their friends thought ten years ago they were or would become; and that therefore, in approaching each other, as they are now so obviously doing, the League and the United States are really advancing to the support of conceptions of international life and peace and toward processes of international cooperation in which both can unite without embarrassment or compromise of former convictions.

The League of Nations is now as firmly established as is the Government of the United States or that of Great Britain. Without it we should not have today the World Court, the indispensable League Secretariat, the International Health Organization, the treaties of Locarno or the Paris Pact, and all the world would be helplessly awaiting the oncoming of another world war, with all which that implies.

While the League has developed in ways and is achieving its purposes in a manner not anticipated in 1920, nevertheless its fundamental character has been so maintained and the value to the cause of peace of frequent face-to-face conferences of the statesmen of many nations has been so proved that its early as well as its newly made friends are justified in the faith that it will go forward, by preference with, but if necessary without, us in gradual

evolution in the future as in the past, creating a world will to peace and an organization to make it effective which will ultimately fulfill the fateful purpose of its founders.

The League needs the cooperation of the United States to accomplish its "great design," but not more than the United States needs the cooperation of the League to give effect to the Paris Pact and to preserve us from another great war in which we should have nothing to gain and much more to lose than any other nation in the world.

To continue to refuse the still standing invitation to membership in the League, with reservations of our own writing, when it may be accepted without embarrassment to those participating in the refusal of 1920, is to permanently place our peace-loving republic in the false position of deliberately opposing the present-day peace movement, which every candid man must see is now simply a supreme effort on the part of many nations to carry forward into international affairs for the pacific settlement of disputes between nations those processes which civilization has slowly developed through centuries and found sufficient for the settlement of private disputes—conciliation, arbitration, courts and law.

Against Joining the League

I.

By DAVID JAYNE HILL

AMBASSADOR TO GERMANY, 1908-11; AUTHOR OF *Problems of the World Court*

AMONG THE future events long looked for by some excellent people, the millennium probably still holds the first place. For a time the introduction of the Anglo-Saxon name for the Deity into the Constitution of the United States was held to be a necessary preliminary to this event. Since the Treaty of Versailles the acceptance by the United States of the covenant of the League of Nations, which constitutes the first part of that treaty, appears to have been the prevailing wish of those who cherish such unfulfilled hopes for the future. In the meantime, much money has been collected and expended in developing popular interest in the realization of this hope, now so long deferred.

The matured and repeated decisions of the American people on this subject, expressed in the Presidential elections of 1920 and 1924, and confirmed by silence in 1928, do not appear to have discouraged the devotees of this persistent propaganda, which has furnished them with an interesting occupation exempt from the excitement of controversy, since there is at present no opposing propaganda in the field. Such expenditure of time and money has not been regarded as necessary.

In the first paragraph of Mr. Kaltenborn's article, printed in this issue of CURRENT HISTORY, he records the fact that, so recently as September, 1929, under the inspiration of the lovely lake at Geneva, a group of Americans, in the spirit of faithful advocates of this preliminary to the millennium, ventured, as its expectant watchers are wont to do, to fix a date when the United States would enter the League as a member, and arranged to celebrate that event in 1935 at the expense of a skeptic willing to wager that it would require more than six years to bring this achievement to realization.

The ground of this expectation, according to Mr. Kaltenborn's article, is

not so much a change in the opinion of the American people and of their representatives on this subject as changes in the League itself and in the practices of its members. The reinterpretation of the covenant and the actual undertakings of the League, it is claimed, are rendering it easier every year for the United States of America to become a member, for the reason that the aims of the covenant have been profoundly modified.

In his exposition of these changes of conception and practice during the ten years of the League's existence, Mr. Kaltenborn's article constitutes a valuable contribution to the elucidation of the subject. There appears, however, to be no reason for believing that these changes in the spirit of the League would have occurred if the United States had been willing to assume the rôle originally marked out for it in the covenant, and to a certain extent distinctly pledged by President Wilson in negotiating the peace of Versailles.

The League, as conceived and defended by President Wilson at Paris, and afterward at home in his contest with the Senate, contained a pledge to employ the preponderant force of the members of the League to repress the outbreak of war anywhere in the world where it might occur, and the United States was appealed to, in the spirit of sacrifice, to promise its assistance in the fulfillment of this pledge. It was the unwillingness of the American people, expressed through their representatives in the Senate and elsewhere, to assume this obligation of exercising through its army and its navy a police power over the world which decided the Government of the United States not to become a member of the League.

Since 1920 the assertion has been constantly made, both at home and abroad, that the refusal of the United States to become a member of the League has prevented it from becoming what it was intended to be. Its inefficiency has been declared to be owing to the alleged default of the United States, and the government, and particularly the Republican party, has been held responsible for this result.

There is no ground for contesting Mr. Kaltenborn's representation that the changes in the League's theory and practice have been on the whole in the right direction, and therefore none for complaint that they are due in large measure to the abstention of the United States. This amounts, however, to a concession that the United States was fully justified in its position and showed great foresight and wisdom in declining to accept the responsibilities and obligations involved in the terms of the covenant as presented and interpreted by its authors in 1919.

Criticism of America

The sometimes bitter criticisms expressed in Europe and repeated in this country upon the decision of the United States not to accept the obligations of the covenant, accompanied, as they usually are, with the continued reproach of delinquency, are themselves conclusive evidence that this abstention has been, to some degree at least, the cause of the League's having turned out to be different in fact from what it was in theory designed and expected to be when in 1919 the United States made its decision not to enter it. If there was deception involved as to what was to be expected of the United States, it was clearly not the fault of the American Government in its constitutional integrity.

Upon this point two comments are necessary.

The first comment is that in 1919 at Paris the requirements of the Constitution of the United States for the ratification of a treaty negotiated and signed by the President "in his own name and by his own proper authority" were neither explained by him, inquired into by the Allies, nor taken into consideration by the European negotiators and signatories even in the presence of a public protest made at that time by an important group in the Senate of the United States. The charge that the Government of the United States repudiated its agreements rests

upon the assumption that the President alone possessed authority to conclude them.

The second comment is that even today statesmen and publicists of other countries, and even some of our own citizens, who are presumed to know these constitutional requirements, represent the United States as a nation in default in not becoming a member of the League of Nations, and reproach this government with delinquency in its failure to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, when, in fact, the President, although acting in a manner contrary to the normal and customary course of procedure, had not pretended to make proposals or to give pledges beyond what is implied in a constitutional interpretation of his expression, "in his own name and by his proper authority." It is evident, therefore, that the treaty-making power of the United States, in its plenitude, was not present at Paris, had given no pledges and had not even made proposals beyond tentative steps in the process of negotiation.

It is therefore surprising that Mr. Kaltenborn, who is presumably aware of all these facts, should deliberately write in his article of "the bad grace of the only country which accepted the League in Paris, and then, for selfish national reasons, repudiated it at home."

It is such insidious accusations, made either in ignorance or in malice, and apparently approved in America, that seem to warrant the unfriendly sentiments of nations which our government is alleged to have treated with injustice—accusations which have misguided great numbers of uninstructed American citizens, causing them to prefer the standards of other governments to the laws which the people have adopted and imposed for the guidance and regulation of our own.

What is it, then, which these complainants desire? Is it that a single person should be entrusted with the pow[illegible]ing solely in his own name and [illegible]his own absolute authority, to [illegible] the American Republic "to preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League" (Article X)? What, then, shall we do to preserve our own independence?

What Have We Repudiated?

What the United States repudiated in 1920 was not anything which it had accepted at Paris but President Wilson's insistence upon Article X as "the heart of the covenant." It was the obligations which grew out of this and other proposed pledges which blocked the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles and in particular of the covenant of the League. Mr. Kaltenborn does not deny this. His argument takes another form. It is that the difference between President Wilson and the Senate was unimportant, and yet the Senate was wrong! With regard to the Senate's reservations he writes:

> A decade of League experience shows us that Wilson's dispute with the Senate concerned issues which were and are largely academic. The League reservations, if accepted, would not have prevented our full cooperation in any League activity. Subsequent interpretations of Article X show that this guarantee of the political independence and territorial integrity of all League members is not "the heart of the covenant." Other countries have also reserved the right to decide for themselves when, and how, and whether they will participate in the enforcement of this article.

So these reservations were merely "academic"! They did not touch upon realities and the dispute was only verbal! Let us see. If, as Mr. Kaltenborn represents, the League of Nations might have accomplished under the reservations all that it was intended to accomplish, or is still able to accomplish, wherein lies the default of the United States?

The Senate was willing and ready to associate the United States in a form of association having for its object the promotion of peace, but not in one which required obligations that would perhaps involve this country in war.

Underwood

DAVID JAYNE HILL

Such an alliance as the covenant called for was opposed to every American tradition. It was both political and military. Why should the American Government be reproached with having repudiated a scheme inconsistent with its traditions, its interests and its ideals of justice? On what ground could this Republic, founded on the rights of man and territorial sovereignty, accept territorial mandates from an alliance based on military conquest, agree to preserve the political control of conquering victors over minorities incorporated under their territorial sovereignty, and send its armies and its navy to maintain a political system based on physical force and not on the consent of peoples?

These questions Mr. Kaltenborn brushes aside as merely "academic." As subjects of discussion in popular debates and propaganda literature they may seem academic, but when we come to the framing of far-reaching national policies, can they still be so regarded? Let the mothers whose sons fell in battle to redeem Europe from war make answer.

There would appear to be no escape from this dilemma. Either the abstention of the United States from accepting the Treaty of Versailles, including its first part, the covenant of the League of Nations, rendered the League incapable of performing the functions expected of it in 1920, or it did not. If it did not render the League incapable, what is the ground of the reproaches made against the decision of the United States to abstain? If this abstention did render the League incapable, what was it that the United States was expected to do that could not be done without the presence of the United States in the League? In brief, upon what occasion, and in what particular, would the League have fulfilled the expectations of it as of 1920, if the United States had been a member?

THE SUBTERFUGE OF AMBIGUITY

Were the issues between President Wilson and the Senate in 1920 only, or even largely, "academic"? Are the main substance and meaning of a treaty mere academic questions? If they are merely or largely academic, what a risk a nation incurs when it submits to the interpretation of a treaty by an international court! If a single nation does not know, and its officers cannot agree upon, what a treaty implies, how can a foreign body, unacquainted perhaps with the history of the treaty and even with the language accepted as the binding text, ever satisfy the disputants with respect to the justice of its judgment?

Is it, then, reprehensible that the Senate refused to ratify a treaty because ten years afterward we discover that its main declared purpose has been nullified or evaded? Was it really intended that every signatory of the covenant of the League of Nations might "reserve the right to decide for itself when, and how, and whether" it would "participate in the enforcement" of what was represented as "the heart of the covenant"? If so, what is the cove-

nant which America is reproached for not having accepted? And why was it deserving of reproach for the United States, when it was examining a treaty, to demand in plain terms what obligations it could accept as a condition of ratification, if all the other signatories secretly held in reserve the right to decide "when, and how, and whether" they would participate in the enforcement of their obligations? Was it not more honorable to reserve this right openly and before ratification rather than to assert it afterward, perhaps at some critical moment of decision, as the signatories are represented as having done?

WAR MENACE IN THE COVENANT

The late Senator Knox, who as Secretary of State had been personally charged with the responsibility of making and interpreting treaties, declared that, in his opinion, the covenant of the League of Nations contained obligations which involved the signatories in the possibility and even the necessity of war. He stated this fact as his main objection to ratifying the Treaty of Versailles, and in particular the covenant of the League.

In submitting the covenant to the plenary conference at Paris for adoption, on Feb. 14, 1919, President Wilson had said: "Armed force is in the background in this program, but it *is* in the background, and if the moral force of the world will not suffice, the physical force of the world shall." Those words were clearly intended to interpret "the heart of the covenant." What, then, did Article X mean when it spoke of "preserving" the territorial integrity and political independence of all the members of the League?

Mr. Knox in a plea for time in considering this question, made a speech in the Senate on June 17, 1919, in which he said:

> As the covenant is now framed, it contains the pernicious provisions embodied in Article X, which are designed to fix through all time—and merit is made of this purpose of the provision—the boundaries set up by the treaty of peace. It is no secret that these boundaries are already, though not yet fixed other than in contemplation, the subject of serious complaint and even of dispute. Peoples are objecting to their disposition by this treaty, which once more hands them about as mere pawns in a game of chess, and those who are so objecting are not our sworn enemies, over whom we stand victorious, but our friends, our allies, our equals in this undertaking and in their rights to enjoy the benefits of its happy fruition. No matter what may be the desires of these discontented peoples in the future, no matter what race affinities may be hereafter worked out, no matter what their real interest may demand or a wise, statesmanlike handling of their affairs would counsel, their boundaries stand fixed, subject to readjustment under such covenant procedure as would make futile any hope of change.
>
> Could any scheme more obliterative of legitimate race and national aspirations be concocted?

Proceeding, as he said, upon the assumption that the League was not "a cadaver, but a living, operating body," Mr. Knox continued:

> I have already on a previous occasion taken the time of the Senate in pointing out that the plan as first proposed not only did not abolish or prevent wars but sanctioned and commanded them, thus giving the lie to the hope of the people that the covenant was to make future war impossible; I have shown how it strikes down our great constitutional principles, bulwarks of our protection; how it robs us of most vital attributes of sovereignty and threatens our independence and life.
>
> Since then the covenant has undergone a reconsideration and a redrafting, and thus refurbished it is again presented semi-officially to the people of the United States for their consideration. Once more I have carefully examined the covenant in its new form, but only to find that instead of having my previously expressed doubts removed, those already entertained are much augmented and others not heretofore held are raised.

Was it, then, a mere "academic" encounter, when, at the colloquy between the President and the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, on Aug.

19, 1919, the President, having read from a prepared written statement the words, "Article X seems to me to constitute the very backbone of the whole covenant. Without it the League would be hardly more than an influential debating society," Mr. Knox requested clarification in the following dialogue:

SENATOR KNOX—Mr. President, allow me to ask this question: Suppose that it is perfectly obvious and accepted that there is an external aggression against some power, and suppose it is perfectly obvious and accepted that it cannot be repelled except by force of arms. Would we be under any legal obligation to participate?

THE PRESIDENT—No, sir; but we would be under *an absolutely compelling moral obligation.*

SENATOR KNOX—But no legal obligation?

THE PRESIDENT—Not as I contemplate it. * * *

SENATOR HARDING—Right there, Mr. President, if there is nothing more than a moral obligation on the part of any member of the League, what avail Articles X and XI?

THE PRESIDENT—Why, Senator, it is surprising that that question should be asked. *If we undertake an obligation we are bound in the most solemn way to carry it out.*

SENATOR HARDING—* * * The point I am trying to get at is, suppose something arises affecting the peace of the world, and the Council takes steps as provided here to conserve or preserve, and announces its decision, and every nation in the League takes advantage of the construction that you place upon these articles, and says: "Well, this is only a moral obligation and we assume that the nation involved does not deserve our participation or protection," the whole thing amounts to nothing but an expression of the League Council.

THE PRESIDENT—* * * When I speak of a legal obligation, I mean one that specifically binds you to do a particular thing under certain sanctions. That is a legal obligation. *Now a moral obligation is, of course, superior to a legal obligation, and, if I may say so, has a greater binding force.* Only there always remains in the moral obligation the right to exercise one's judgment as to whether it is, indeed, incumbent upon one in those circumstances to do that thing. In every moral obligation there is an element of judgment, in a legal obligation there is no element of judgment.

This was, indeed, academic reasoning. A moral is, of course, superior to a legal obligation, the President said, "and has a greater binding force"; yet, notwithstanding this compelling moral obligation, Congress is left absolutely free in each case to put its own interpretation upon the question whether or not there is *any* obligation! And all this in face of Article VI, Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the basis of all legality for the American Government, which reads: "This Constitution and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land."

Whatever the covenant of the League might mean for other signatories, for the United States, if ratified, it meant that the covenant was a part of the supreme law of the land. Where, then, would the war power in the United States rest—in the Constitution or in the recommendations of the Council of the League?

As Mr Knox and others saw it, the covenant of the League contains in advance a conditional declaration of war in the terms of Article XVI: "It shall be the duty of the Council to recommend to the several governments concerned what effective military or naval force the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League."

Was there no duty of any kind to protect these covenants on the part of the members of the League? What, then, was to become of "the heart" or "the backbone" of the covenant, and make it other, to use the President's words, than a "debating society" which had ceased to be even "influential"?

THE SEAT OF THE WAR POWER

What, in 1919, was British opinion with regard to the obligations of the United States under the covenant? Viscount Grey has left an interesting rec-

ord on this subject. Did the obligations of the covenant involve the contingency of war? Although accustomed to move in a different political atmosphere from that created by a written constitution, Viscount Grey realized the serious nature of the dispute between the President and the Senate, and did not hesitate to point it out in a letter to the London *Times*. "You cannot, you should not, pledge a democracy in such a matter without consulting it, without clearly knowing its mind," he wrote; and, illustrating what he meant by referring to the question he had to face in 1914, he added: "I could not be sure that on any point of interest the British democracy was willing to go into a great war. And what a cruel disappointment to another nation if I had given a pledge, and the pledge had not been kept because the people did not endorse it!"

Here is well expressed the constructive principle on which the exercise of the war power is based in the United States—only Congress, the representative of the people, can declare war. The covenant of the League of Nations is not based on that principle. It pledges the nations to war in advance upon certain express contingencies. Viscount Grey did not hesitate to make this clear. "The Senate," he pointed out, "by the American Constitution, is an independent element in the treaty-making power. Its refusal to ratify the treaty cannot expose either itself or the country to a charge of bad faith or of repudiation; nor is it fair to represent the United States as holding up the treaty solely from motives of party politics, thereby sacrificing the interests of other nations for this petty consideration."

But Viscount Grey goes still more deeply into the situation in his letter to the *Times*. "The American Constitution," he says, "not only makes possible, but under certain conditions renders inevitable, a conflict between the Executive and the Legislature." If, for example, the President should promise to another nation something which the Congress did not approve, such a conflict would arise, and it was intended in planning the structure of our government that in such a case it should arise; for such a conflict furnishes the most effective method of clearly ascertaining the mind of the American people and obtaining their consent, which otherwise might be arbitrarily assumed where it did not exist, even in so grave a matter as being involved in war.

As Viscount Grey reads the document, "it would be possible, if the covenant of the League of Nations stands, for a President in some future years to commit the United States, through its American representative on the Council of the League of Nations, to a policy which the Legislature at that time might disapprove. That contingency is one which cannot arise in Great Britain, where the government is daily responsible to the representative authority of the House of Commons, and where, in case of conflict between the House of Commons and the government, the latter must either immediately give way, or public opinion must decide between them and assert itself by an immediate general election. But in the United States it is otherwise. The contingency is within the region of practical politics. They have reason, and if they so desire the right, to provide against it."

The Illusion of Preponderant Power

President Wilson had a personal faith in the possibility of preventing war by the menace and pressure of preponderant power, and he believed the exercise of predominant power was provided for in the obligations of the covenant of the League of Nations. Ten years of experience have confirmed what a clearer insight into the political structure of Europe made evident upon a close examination at the time, that no such predominant power to prevent war really resides in the League. It can propose, it can debate, it can caution, it can recommend; but it cannot execute. And yet the obligations of the League require it to execute its pledges.

The faith in predominant power rested on the military results of the great war. In this the participation of the

Harris & Ewing

HENRY CABOT LODGE
Leader of the opposition to the League in the United States Senate

United States was a determining factor. President Wilson believed that he could commit the United States to a pledge that it would continue to be a factor, and become a permanent factor.

Time has shown that the United States is not disposed to assume the rôle assigned it in the organization of the League of Nations, and also that there is no other nation that is prepared to use its armed forces for the purpose of enforcing Article X of the covenant. The rôle of the menace of preponderant force is ended. "The war against war" is a mere conflict of human emotions, a crusader's dream, as ineffectual historically as the struggle for possession of the Holy Sepulchre. It was seeking to fulfill the destiny of man not by the way of life but by the way of death.

Mr. Kaltenborn is aware of it, as every observing and thinking man must be. He says that the League, which was organized to prevent war, is now engaged in trying to promote peace. This is true, and it shows wisdom. And it also reveals the impotency of the League of Nations to prevent bloodshed by threatening bloodshed. And it is not alone bloodshed that its pretense of preponderant force cannot control. The League has not been able in any important matter to enforce its will. Directly and by its own authority it has not been able to impose the limitation of armament which the covenant demands. It has not undertaken to intervene effectively in the proper administration of mandates and would not venture upon a redistribution of them, nor has it been able to secure the rights of minorities. Above all, the League would never dream at present of coercing any great power.

Our Cooperation With the League

Mr. Kaltenborn counts it as mark of progress toward membership that the United States has found it possible to cooperate with the League in many matters of international and humanitarian interest. There is not, and there never has been, any reason for not cooperating with the League in all matters of universal interest where the policies of the League and those of the United States coincide or look in the same direction. The principle of concurrent action, as distinguished from the obligations of alliance, has always been recognized and acted upon throughout the whole history of this country; but a sharp line of demarcation has always been drawn between what the United States *may* do and what it *must* do with, for and to other nations. No nation has been more prompt to relieve distress, to safeguard health, to maintain the standards of virtue and to promote universal human well-being.

But this principle of concurrent action has always been so exercised as to avoid entanglements with other nations by not intervening in issues between them. Indeed, upon occasion great pains have been taken to forewarn other nations that, in coacting with them, there was to be no intrusion into their affairs, and that no intrusion on their part was expected in American affairs.

This is the substance of the Monroe Doctrine, which, even before its formal enunciation as a doctrine, was in substance the instinctive self-protective policy of the American Republic as a new enterprise of self-government. At The Hague in 1899, and again in 1907, the international conferences held there were reminded that "nothing contained in the convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions or policy of any foreign State; nor shall anything contained in the said convention be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions."

Nothing like this was recalled or implied in the conference of 1919 at Paris, but this declaration was immediately recalled in America, and insisted upon as expressing the attitude of the nation; with the result that the covenant of the League was seen to signalize the abandonment of this attitude by President Wilson, who defended this relinquishment by explaining that the covenant was "intended to extend the Monroe Doctrine to the entire world!"

American Objection to Joining

There is no disposition on the part of the present writer to revive the heated controversies of 1919 and 1920, but he would be a faithless historian who would permit it to be assumed that cooperation with the League of Nations in matters in which this Republic has always cooperated with all nations implies a readiness on the part of the American people to enter into a compact which so completely reverses the traditional policy of the United States as the obligations of the covenant of the League of Nations were designed to do. It was a strong repugnance to the idea that the securities of peace were to be elaborated under the shadow of the menace of war that led a brilliant editorial writer to picture the covenant as "the evil thing with the holy name." It seemed a hard saying, but it put in a single phrase the equivocations of peace by preponderant power.

President Harding and his advisers, both before and after his electoral campaign, did not hesitate to designate the League of Nations "a political and military alliance"--a designation which has never been refuted.

President Coolidge referred to the League as "a foreign agency," in which the traditional American foreign policy did not permit the United States to participate.

President Hoover, Mr. Kaltenborn reminds us, in his inaugural message said: "Our people have determined that we should make no political engagement such as membership in the League of Nations. They adhere to the belief that the independence of America from such obligations increases its ability and availability for service in all fields of human progress." And again in his Armistice Day address on Nov. 11, 1929, President Hoover said: "The European nations have, by the covenant of the League of Nations, agreed that if nations fail to settle their differences peaceably, then force should be applied by other nations to compel them to be reasonable. We have refused to travel this road. We are confident that at least in the Western Hemisphere public opinion will suffice to check violence. This is the road we propose to travel."

This brings official Presidential utterances to the present date; but all this, Mr. Kaltenborn suggests, may not interfere with the proposed celebration in 1935! He makes bold to comment on the first of President Hoover's utterances quoted above:

> Let us note in the first place that Herbert Hoover does not say that *he* has "determined" or that *he* "adheres to the belief." There is good ground for believing, on the basis of his record, and remembering some of his earlier statements about the League, that he would be willing now as then to have the United States accept membership under appropriate conditions. But he believes that public opinion still opposes our signing the covenant, and he evidently has no desire to combat public opinion on this issue.

This gratuitous insinuation that President Hoover does not share the public opinion which still opposes our signing the covenant is not very solid ground for expecting Executive commitment to seeking membership in the League of Nations. Whatever one at some time may have thought regarding an unstudied proposal, after all that has occurred, a true lover of his country will not lightly divide public sentiment and sacrifice a nation's independence by involving it in equivocal agreements and unnecessary adventures affecting the well-being of future generations.

A Parliament of Man

Much has been said, and much can be truly said, of the advantages of a meeting place where the great international questions of the moment can be freely and openly discussed by those who are affected by the issues involved. True leadership in human progress does not reside in men who act upon their own individual thoughts. It rests in those who speak for the peoples, and who represent their convictions and interests as the peoples themselves conceive them.

Such exponents of national life have been heard in the meetings of the Council and the Assembly of the League at Geneva. Germany has found a voice in Stresemann; France in Briand; Great Britain in MacDonald. These men have spoken with authority because they have been clothed with authority. Notwithstanding the hierarchical character of the League as an organization, partly perhaps on account of it, their influence has been great and beneficent. This is too obvious to be disputed, and it may justly be stated that the League has provided a forum for expression that has been in some respects of great advantage for Europe and the whole world.

The League has, however, been of most utility to Europe. The Near East and the Far East have profited little from these contacts. No great issue in the outlying portions of the globe has been settled or greatly modified by the counsels and debates at Geneva. The reason for this is evident. At Geneva the great powers of Europe can be represented by their Prime Ministers almost overnight. For more distant countries only secondary representatives, subject to instructions and overruling, are possible. The difference in authority is great. For America an equality in this respect with the European powers is impossible. Only upon infrequent occasions, and for brief intervals, could so important a spokesman as the Secretary of State of the United States be personally present; and the President, who instructs him, virtually never.

But is the League of Nations the whole of the Parliament of Man? Can it ever become so? Can either Council or Assembly sit in perpetual session? The press, the telephone and the radio have taken the place of secret meetings and even of closed auditoriums. The United States, which cannot every day, if any day, speak with the authority of the nation at Geneva, is not excluded from using its voice from Washington on any day and at any hour. It is not excluded from the Parliament of Man, and its voice can be heard and will be listened to everywhere.

Every one who is intimately acquainted with the march of international events knows that most of the great steps in advance that have been taken during the last ten years were not initiated at Geneva. This is notably the case with the Pact of Paris of Aug. 27, 1928, in which sixty-three nations have pledged themselves to renounce war as an instrument of national policy and to seek recourse to pacific means for the settlement of international disputes. This step could not have been taken in 1919. The war psychosis was too dominant.

Can the League of Nations live up to the status of 1930? If so, there is no need for the United States to ratify a covenant that is now superseded by the results of ten years of experience. But will the United States fight a nation whose government breaks its pledge? No; but it will not thereafter soon, if ever, trust any of its promises. It will

leave it to its own moral bankruptcy. Will the United States lend its support to a nation which is the victim of forceful aggression? It will leave to the occasion the decision as to what it should do. In the meantime, by concurrent action in all good works, it will leave the League of Nations to work out its own destiny.

THE ORGANIZATION OF JUSTICE

By far the finest result brought forth by the League of Nations is something which was not contained in the original League to Enforce Peace which President Wilson set out to impose upon the peace settlements at Paris, namely, a Permanent Court of International Justice. This project had been first proposed by the United States in the instructions sent to the delegates to the first, and repeated to those of the second, conference for the limitation of armaments at The Hague. But at Paris, in 1919, all this was overlooked or considered of little importance until it was pressed upon the attention of the Peace Conference from the outside to a point which compelled recognition.

It would be a work of supererogation for the present writer to discuss here the problem of a World Court, regarding which his views have been fully expressed and still remain unanswered. Nor is it necessary here to recount the obstacles which have been placed in the way of establishing a court of international justice based on a recognized body of definite international law, in a sense corresponding to that in which the Supreme Court of the United States is itself subject to a fundamental law which controls its decisions. It was not, however, upon this subject, but upon the prospect of the United States accepting membership in the League of Nations, that the present article was prepared.

What the writer has here tried to emphasize is the folly of seeking political entanglement when all the duties of a nation can be performed by concurrent action with others without the sacrifice of its independence. And to this statement he would add a mere expression of opinion that, if, on appearing at the front door of either League or Court, in contemplation of entering, we should suggest, as a condition of entrance, that a back door should be kept open for our exit, this condition might justly be regarded as an awkward political device for quieting our conscience in the presence of our own misgivings, and would be a concession that our decision had been premature.

II.

By PHILIP MARSHALL BROWN

PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

THE RELATIONS of the United States with the League of Nations have become rather a question of fact than of speculation or argument. We are more interested in defining the exact nature of these relations than in controversial discussions regarding the future attitude of the United States toward the League. The main facts about these relations would seem to be as follows:

1. The unquestioned basic principle of American foreign policy until 1919 was non-participation in the political disputes of Europe.

2. President Wilson in 1919 advocated the abandonment of this principle even to the extent of pledging the United States, in partnership with Great Britain, to guarantee France against aggression by Germany along the Rhine.

3. After prolonged discussion, marked by political partisanship on both sides, the American people were not convinced either of the necessity or the wisdom of abandoning this cardinal principle of foreign policy. The attempts of Governor Cox in 1920 and of John W. Davis in 1924—both Dem

cratic candidates for the Presidency— to make it an issue failed completely. And in 1928 the Democratic party platform and its candidate, Governor Smith, absolutely ignored the League of Nations, thus implying that both the two great parties were in accord in adhering to the traditional principle of non-participation in the political controversies of Europe.

4. The League of Nations, without the active participation of the United States as a member, has had a remarkable record of usefulness and achievements. There may well exist doubt with respect to the exact measure of success of the League in the settlement of political controversies, but there can be no doubt of its success in the non-political field. Its activities affecting the welfare of the peoples of the world, notably of Europe, have become so varied and so comprehensive as to be amazing. The Secretariat of the League has become a highly efficient organization characterized by a spendid spirit of service and devotion. The many commissions and agencies of the League dealing with the economic, judicial, moral, intellectual and physical interests of mankind are eloquent evidence of the usefulness of the League. It has more than justified its creation by its achievements in the field of non-political affairs.

5. The traditional policy of the United States of abstention from European politics has not precluded a generous, active and valuable cooperation with the League in this vast field of non-political affairs. This cooperation with the various commissions and agencies of the League has been so general and conspicuous as to require no detailed exposition. It has been generously acknowledged by many of those who would like to see the United States a full member of the League. Outside the League the United States has obviously played a most important rôle in facilitating through the Dawes and Young plans the settlement of the overshadowing problem of reparations, with its serious political implications, and in advancing the cause of disarmament

PHILIP MARSHALL BROWN

through the Washington conference of 1921 and the naval discussions with Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan still in progress. It is of particular interest to note that many individual Americans have been able to render signal services to the League of Nations in varied situations, such, for example, as the rehabilitation of the finances of Hungary by Jeremiah Smith, relief work in Greece by Henry Morgenthau and Charles Howland, the Memel arbitration by Norman Davis and the judicial inquiry concerning the Aaland Islands, in which Judge Elkus participated. It is a fair question whether their usefulness was not considerably enhanced by the very fact that they were independent nationals of a country in no way implicated in the political controversies of Europe, of which the dispute between Poland and Lithuania over Memel is a conspicuous illustration.

6. The American people have long demonstrated their instinct for friendly cooperation and their generous sympa-

thetic interest in the welfare of other peoples. The earliest evidence of this international mindedness is to be found in the immense amount of money and the devotion of thousands of Americans, whether at home or abroad, to the cause of foreign missions and to other educational and philanthropic enterprises throughout the world. We are warranted in recalling the widespread and amazing benefactions of foundations like the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations, of Belgian relief, of Near East relief, or of private gifts by millionaires or by many Americans of small means. The sum total of these benefactions cannot, of course, be accurately computed, but it may fairly be termed stupendous. In view of such practical evidence of an international altruism and sense of responsibility on the part of the American people, recrimination to the contrary would seem singularly misplaced and grotesquely unjust.

Thus far we have been considering those main aspects of the relations of the United States to Europe and the League about which there would appear little, if any, room for controversy. We may now turn to those aspects concerning which there is a profound difference of opinion.

Those who frankly favor the abandonment of the traditional foreign policy of the United States with respect to Europe, while recognizing that it is now futile to urge American membership in the League, argue nevertheless for a much closer relationship than cooperation in its non-political activities. They hold that the United States should never appear to favor in any way a nation declared by the League of Nations to be the enemy of international good order.

It is argued that the United States is bound to acquiesce in those measures of constraint or sanctions against an enemy of international order which may be decreed by the League. They insist that under the new world order neutrality has become obsolete; that the United States must either be with the League or opposed to it when proceeding against a disturber of international peace.

This argument is further fortified by the existence of the General Pact for the Renunciation of War, which is held to supplement the covenant of the League, and thus to imply, by reason of the adherence of the United States to the pact, a much closer relationship with the League itself. It is claimed that the pact must be regarded either as a generous gesture or as requiring that the signatory powers should unite in common action against a violator of the pact in accordance with the provision of the preamble denying "the benefits furnished by this treaty" to any nation violating the pact.

It must be conceded at the outset as a general principle that the American people have too live a sense of right and wrong to be willing for a moment to appear to favor by an attitude of neutrality any nation which may have become an international outlaw. There would seem no room for argument on that score. The occasion for argument arises, however, over two major issues; first, the determination of the fact that a nation has become an outlaw, and, second, the determination of the precise sanctions or measures of constraint to be employed against such nation.

Question of Aggression

On the first point, namely, the determination of the fact of wrongful aggression or outlawry, there would seem room for an honest difference of opinion. It is generally conceded, however, that at times of acute international crises, after months of diplomatic fencing and playing for positions, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine which nation is the blatant and unabashed aggressor. An instance of this is the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.

Furthermore, the immediate and effective protection of foreigners exposed to cruelties and to the uncontrolled fury of mobs when civil government is powerless or ceases to exist may re-

Associated Press

Architect's drawing of the new $5,000,000 League Palace. The cornerstone was laid in September, 1929

quire a nation to employ armed forces, even if it may thereby be open to the charge of becoming an unlawful aggressor, either under the covenant of the League of Nations or under the Kellogg pact.

Another significant fact in this connection is that the Kellogg pact, according to its official protagonists, leaves intact the right of self-defense, although no attempt has been made to define what constitutes an act of self-defense. There are those who hold that this right permits the protection of nationals by armed forces as well as the adoption of measures to avert a threatening aggression. The door is therefore left wide open to serious divergences of opinion and to recriminations of a disturbing nature concerning this fundamental issue of the determination of the fact of international crime and outlawry.

Still another consideration of the utmost importance is the inability of the United States to pledge itself to accept in advance any decision of the League concerning an alleged violation of international order. It is by no means unlikely that American public opinion might in some instances be overwhelmingly opposed to the decision or action of the League. An unpleasant contingency of this nature may be found in the agreement of 1921 between Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, whereby Italy was given a free hand in its dealings with Albania. It was agreed, furthermore, that if this question should ever arise in the League of Nations the contracting powers would instruct their representatives in the sense of this agreement. In such a case the action of the League would be prejudiced or predetermined in a way that might prove repugnant to the sense of fair play of the American people.

To ask the United States in such circumstances to accept in advance the fiat of the League would be to ask the impossible. We could not be expected either to participate in such a controversy or to abandon the right of the United States to remain neutral and to maintain its claims to the freedom of the seas. Hence the United States is bound to resist any argument to reduce its navy to a point where it would be unable to prevent interference with its lawful rights on the high seas, whether by the League, by a single nation or a group of nations.

We have seen the inherent difficulties of determining the fairness and justice of the fact of international wrongdoing. There remains to be considered the other problem of the determination of the measures of constraint or sanctions to be employed against an international wrongdoer.

Dangerous Sanctions

First of all, it is to be noted that the League of Nations has never been able to agree upon the methods of applying the sanctions contemplated by Article XVI of the covenant of the League. These include, it should be remembered, "the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nations

and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a member of the League or not." In view of these amazing provisions it is not to be wondered at that no plan has been devised for the application of these sanctions. So, likewise, with the sanction of military force, which plainly is too grave and dangerous a measure to be contemplated even in the abstract. The great powers are most reluctant to deal with the problem at all before it actually arises in a concrete instance. They recognize that the very threat of coercion or of a general war by the League is too repugnant to be discussed freely in principle.

In view of these obstacles in the way of collective action against alleged disturbers of international order, the attitude of the United States toward the League of Nations would seem reasonably clear. While seeking every opportunity for cooperation with the League in all of its worthy non-political activities, we are bound to adhere to our well-tested policy of non-intervention in the political controversies of Europe and of preserving our freedom of initiative and action in international affairs. This policy is dictated by no selfish motives of indifference or complacency. It is dictated by the logic of the situation and by the requirements of our international duty. We are not to be misled by flattering allusions to our "moral leadership," by ridicule, or by manifestly unjust taunts of selfish "isolation." The logic of the situation would seem to compel the United States for the sake of its larger interests in international justice and friendship to retain its full freedom of judgment and action, as it did in 1917, to decide at what moment and in what manner it will aid in the defense of international order. We cannot permit other nations having peculiar regional prejudices and problems of their own to prescribe the exact line of duty of the United States. Surely, there can exist no reasonable or just doubt concerning the inherent love of peace and fair play among the American people. They deserve to be trusted with the decision of the proper fulfillment of the international obligations of the United States whenever such obligations should appear to be clear and imperative.

The International Labor Office: A Criticism

By MATTHEW WOLL
Vice President American Federation of Labor

IN ALL ITS PREVIOUS HISTORY the world had never tried such an experiment as that embodied in the International Labor Office. Even after ten years it is difficult for an American trade unionist to believe that it is today more than an experiment, the precise value of which it is still difficult to estimate.

The interest of American labor in the International Labor Office has not been unsympathetic. It could not have been, if for no other reason than the fact that the commission which brought it into being in Paris was presided over by Samuel Gompers, that great American whose teachings we shall always regard as the soundest American labor has ever had. And yet we shall never cease to marvel at the fact that Gompers, whose great plea to legislators ever was for freedom from undue legislative interference in industrial relations, should have played so great a part in and become so partisan to an organization whose major achievements cannot be recorded except through legislation of the social reform type.

It is not necessary to recall that the International Labor Organization was set up by a commission created by the peace conference at the conclusion of the World War, that its machinery and its objectives are set forth in Article XIII of the Treaty of Versailles, that its funds are derived from the League of Nations and that its headquarters are in Geneva where a director presides over the operations of the office, which has a large staff recruited from some thirty nations. Nor is it necessary to state in more than essence that representatives of member nations, their employers and their workers, gather at least yearly in the conference, which is the legislative body and that in the interim a governing body acts as an advisory body, steering committee and prepares the agenda for the next conference. The machinery is simple and somewhat flexible. Moreover it is augmented by a considerable number of committees of experts and by somewhat loose, but cooperative relations with outside groups these relations being neither specifically forbidden nor specifically sanctioned.

The prime objective of the International Labor Organization is the procurement of social justice. It is set forth that the League of Nations "has for its object the establishment of universal peace, and such a peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice." Therefore the principal purpose at Geneva is to see that the world moves toward social justice, without which universal peace becomes an idle dream if we accept the viewpoint written into this section of the Treaty of Versailles by the then high contracting parties. It would seem, if the thought may be interjected, that the high contracting parties shifted the major part of their responsibility upon the International Labor Organization and left a relatively weak machine to carry that enormous burden! In any event we have it set down as the mission of the Geneva organization to promote social justice and at least thereby minimize the cause for war. In making

this the prime objective, a tremendous burden is laid upon the International Labor Organization. It is hard to believe that it is capable of discharging that responsibility, though it may contribute something in that direction.

The International Labor Organization was confronted at the outset with an appalling task. The treaty of peace, while ending one war, declared that even then the causes of more war existed in the prevalent social inequities of the world. It is written therein that "conditions of labor exist involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperiled." Ten years have passed since that declaration of the existence of the seeds of more war. Though the reports and records of the International Labor Organization are filled with voluminous accounts of meetings, resolutions, conventions and statistics, the menace of embroilment has, as a matter of cold fact, been but slightly reduced, if it has been reduced at all, for, if social injustice is the cause of war, or even a cause of war, then to remove a little of it, to erase spots of it here and there, may quite probably mean nothing at all.

The International Labor Organization is not responsible for the task laid upon it, nor for the indictment of civilization contained in the Treaty of Versailles, nor yet for the challenge given to the world in that same treaty to remove social injustice or face the probability of war. It is not, it must also be said, responsible for the unwillingness of nations and of employers within nations to remove injustice. Like all children, it was brought into a world of tremendous tasks, having had no previous word of decision as to whether it "wanted to be born" into that kind of world for that sort of task or any other. The Versailles Treaty said, "There is the job, you go and do it." Try as we will, we shall not find that injustice is being removed through the International Labor Organization with enough speed to mean much as a preventive. To form a fair judgment it may be best to forget all about the treaty and the matter of universal peace.

Basis of Judgment

On what other basis can the International Labor Organization be judged? Clearly only in this way: Is it trying to do something that needs to be done? If so, is it doing enough in that direction to justify itself? And is it proceeding in a manner that will not beget ills as important as those it seeks to cure? There are three questions. To some the first two will appear all important and the third irrelevant. To others the third will appear all important and the first two irrelevant. The third question calls up questions of basic social philosophy to be discussed later.

What is the International Labor Organization trying to do? How does it proceed in the enormous task of eliminating social injustice? Broadly speaking, it seeks to bring nations into agreement to make certain practices unlawful and to compel certain other practices. It seeks to bring the nations into agreement through what are known as draft conventions, which is a clumsy, diplomatic expression meaning that there is laid before each nation a draft of an agreement which it is hoped the nation will ratify. After ratification the ratifying nation is bound to enact laws in accord therewith and to report annually on what has been done toward creating the desired condition. There have been formulated about twenty-seven draft conventions, supplemented by some twenty-nine recommendations supplementing them. There have been some 346 ratifications of conventions. These conventions deal with hours of labor, child labor, the labor of women, compensation for accidents and disease, health insurance, industrial hygiene, freedom of association, inspection of emigrants on board ship, seamen's articles of agreement and repatriation of seamen.

If we grant that it is desirable to proceed in this way toward the securing of social justice, then it may be

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granted that the International Labor Organization has justified its existence and warranted support and confidence. Beyond doubt many of the draft conventions have constituted a challenge to backward industrialists and to backward nations. It is said that because of he work of the International Labor Organization India has reduced the ours of adult factory workers from eventy-two a week to sixty, and that n Persia children have been relieved of he thousand-year-old curse of having begin at 4 or 5 years of age a knotying task in rug making that made f them deformed slaves, so stiffened their occupational contortion that ventually they had to be carried to d from their work. It is recorded that oland has ratified thirteen convenons, Cuba sixteen, Italy twelve, Spain d India eleven each, Great Britain d France fifteen each. These ratifitions represent promises to do cerin things and to report on the stewdship thus assumed. Granting again, for the moment, that the method is the right method, what is indicated? Patently, not what is seen on the surface.

Poland, Cuba, Italy and Spain are ruled by dictators. The very rudiments of social justice are denied in these countries. Basic rights, out of which all others grow, which underlie all true freedom, have been rendered meaningless under the dictatorships that rule these nations. Pretty generally free speech, free assembly, free press and free associations are denied in these nations. All of them, except Cuba, have ratified a convention to guarantee the right of association. Except for that one convention Cuba, perhaps the lowest of all in the scale of things that make for freedom, happiness and workers' well-being, has ratified almost everything offered by Geneva. Yet it has enacted legislation giving effect to only one convention, that governing night work in bakeries. It has done nothing to affect the welfare of the vast masses of her people employed in the sugar industry. It is true that it will be called upon to report and it may be made to feel something of disapproval for having been so slow.

So it may be with the other dictatorships. Italy has destroyed free trade unions. Geneva is not only powerless to prevent that, but it must accept the Fascist union representative when he comes to Geneva to sit in the annual conference. Thus it is mandatory upon Geneva to recognize the overthrow of one of its cardinal principles. This failure is absolutely vital from the American standpoint and is a crucial test of the Geneva method, for we believe that progress in leveling up the conditions of backward countries must come mainly from free labor organization and only to a very minor degree from benevolent legislation, which is often offered, as in Italy, as camouflage wholly or partly to cover up an anti-labor union governmental policy.

We know that a certain number of conventions have been ratified, but we do not know what these ratifications mean in terms of actual changed conditions for men and women throughout

this the prime objective, a tremendous burden is laid upon the International Labor Organization. It is hard to believe that it is capable of discharging that responsibility, though it may contribute something in that direction.

The International Labor Organization was confronted at the outset with an appalling task. The treaty of peace, while ending one war, declared that even then the causes of more war existed in the prevalent social inequities of the world. It is written therein that "conditions of labor exist involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperiled." Ten years have passed since that declaration of the existence of the seeds of more war. Though the reports and records of the International Labor Organization are filled with voluminous accounts of meetings, resolutions, conventions and statistics, the menace of embroilment has, as a matter of cold fact, been but slightly reduced, if it has been reduced at all, for, if social injustice is the cause of war, or even a cause of war, then to remove a little of it, to erase spots of it here and there, may quite probably mean nothing at all.

The International Labor Organization is not responsible for the task laid upon it, nor for the indictment of civilization contained in the Treaty of Versailles, nor yet for the challenge given to the world in that same treaty to remove social injustice or face the probability of war. It is not, it must also be said, responsible for the unwillingness of nations and of employers within nations to remove injustice. Like all children, it was brought into a world of tremendous tasks, having had no previous word of decision as to whether it "wanted to be born" into that kind [illegible] world for that sort of task or any [illegible]r. The Versailles Treaty said, [illegible]ere is the job, you go and do it." [illegible]y as we will, we shall not find that injustice is being removed through the International Labor Organization with enough speed to mean much as a preventive. To form a fair judgment it may be best to forget all about the treaty and the matter of universal peace.

Basis of Judgment

On what other basis can the International Labor Organization be judged? Clearly only in this way: Is it trying to do something that needs to be done? If so, is it doing enough in that direction to justify itself? And is it proceeding in a manner that will not beget ills as important as those it seeks to cure? There are three questions. To some the first two will appear all important and the third irrelevant. To others the third will appear all important and the first two irrelevant. The third question calls up questions of basic social philosophy to be discussed later.

What is the International Labor Organization trying to do? How does it proceed in the enormous task of eliminating social injustice? Broadly speaking, it seeks to bring nations into agreement to make certain practices unlawful and to compel certain other practices. It seeks to bring the nations into agreement through what are known as draft conventions, which is a clumsy, diplomatic expression meaning that there is laid before each nation a draft of an agreement which it is hoped the nation will ratify. After ratification the ratifying nation is bound to enact laws in accord therewith and to report annually on what has been done toward creating the desired condition. There have been formulated about twenty-seven draft conventions, supplemented by some twenty-nine recommendations supplementing them. There have been some 346 ratifications of conventions. These conventions deal with hours of labor, child labor, the labor of women, compensation for accidents and disease, health insurance, industrial hygiene, freedom of association, inspection of emigrants on board ship, seamen's articles of agreement and repatriation of seamen.

If we grant that it is desirable to proceed in this way toward the securing of social justice, then it may be

Harris & Ewing

MATTHEW WOLL

granted that the International Labor Organization has justified its existence and warranted support and confidence. Beyond doubt many of the draft conventions have constituted a challenge to backward industrialists and to backward nations. It is said that because of the work of the International Labor Organization India has reduced the hours of adult factory workers from seventy-two a week to sixty, and that in Persia children have been relieved of the thousand-year-old curse of having to begin at 4 or 5 years of age a knot-tying task in rug making that made of them deformed slaves, so stiffened in their occupational contortion that eventually they had to be carried to and from their work. It is recorded that Poland has ratified thirteen conventions, Cuba sixteen, Italy twelve, Spain and India eleven each, Great Britain and France fifteen each. These ratifications represent promises to do certain things and to report on the stewardship thus assumed. Granting again, for the moment, that the method is the right method, what is indicated? Patently, not what is seen on the surface.

Poland, Cuba, Italy and Spain are ruled by dictators. The very rudiments of social justice are denied in these countries. Basic rights, out of which all others grow, which underlie all true freedom, have been rendered meaningless under the dictatorships that rule these nations. Pretty generally free speech, free assembly, free press and free associations are denied in these nations. All of them, except Cuba, have ratified a convention to guarantee the right of association. Except for that one convention Cuba, perhaps the lowest of all in the scale of things that make for freedom, happiness and workers' well-being has ratified almost everything offered by Geneva. Yet it has enacted legislation giving effect to only one convention, that governing night work in bakeries. It has done nothing to affect the welfare of the vast masses of her people employed in the sugar industry. It is true that it will be called upon to report and it may be made to feel something of disapproval for having been so slow.

So it may be with the other dictatorships. Italy has destroyed free trade unions. Geneva is not only powerless to prevent that, but it must accept the Fascist union representative when he comes to Geneva to sit in the annual conference. Thus it is mandatory upon Geneva to recognize the overthrow of one of its cardinal principles. This failure is absolutely vital from the American standpoint and is a crucial test of the Geneva method, for we believe that progress in leveling up the conditions of backward countries must come mainly from free labor organization and only to a very minor degree from benevolent legislation, which is often offered, as in Italy, as camouflage wholly or partly to cover up an anti-labor union governmental policy.

We know that a certain number of conventions have been ratified, but we do not know what these ratifications mean in terms of actual changed conditions for men and women throughout

the world. We know that in such cases as the dictatorships just cited, ratifications are more or less monumental pretense. Even if a dictator stoops to grant a change in fact, he may with equal facility take it away the next day. As a matter of fact nothing has been gained while the dictatorship exists.

Again we find Great Britain and France generously ratifying. We find Czechoslovakia almost as generous. Germany and Poland are neck-and-neck in the race for honors at Geneva. Yet no nation is more desperately involved in domestic problems involving social injustice than Great Britain, few industrialized nations pay lower wages than France and Czechoslovakia. And who imagines that the neck-and-neck Poland and Germany are actually neck-and-neck in point of either freedom or material well-being for the masses of their people?

Unlike the free-trade doctrinaires who dominate not only the British Government but the labor movement of leading European nations, American labor has little hope of the capture of the cheap-labor markets of China and India by the simple, but mainly imaginary, process of leveling up Asiatic wages, through the action of the international labor office. MacDonald and the Labor party actually offered this specious remedy to the British electorate as a substitute for that minimum of protection which, it seems, is required by certain British industries. It is true that the British economic system rests on a foundation entirely different from ours and that these are questions for British labor to decide. However, it is clearly evident that there are British industries which require protection, and that MacDonald is aware of the necessity by reason of the substitute he has urged. But it is to be doubted whether his substitute will long remain adequate in the eyes of the British trade unions, which in the long run will control the British Labor party if it is to represent the labor classes.

In point of practical, actual, material progress, Geneva batters weakly

Harris & Ewing

SAMUEL GOMPERS

against a terribly backward world, against ignorance, reaction, callousness and sheer immovability. It writes up fine scores that mean nothing or nearly nothing. Why pretend that any substantial progress has been made for freedom, for the removal of social injustice, in Italy and Spain and Cuba? But there is something more fundamental, to which allusion has already been made. It is the very nature of the whole Geneva experiment, that experiment which is charged with making universal peace possible.

Aside from the value of talk as a means of moving people, the value of discussion, exposition, discovery of facts, Geneva must move to the actual recording of progress through a certain type of legislation. At bottom and in the end it is a venture in so-called labor legislation. In the main and finally it must, if it removes social injustice at all, do it through such legislation enacted by the member States. The con-

ventions already drafted, and in many cases ratified, point the way. Rather they tread the path indicated at Versailles. The State, often without any effective pressure either from labor or from democracy, becomes the primary agency for making progress. Hours of labor, unemployment insurance, sickness insurance, health insurance, safety, night work, all these things become matters for the benevolent State and the State takes over a whole program of social legislation as the accepted guardian of the people.

From the standpoint of American labor, which, we believe, is the right standpoint, this whole idea is wrong, because the governmental overshadows or replaces the economic and political functioning of peoples through voluntary associations. American labor is interested, mainly, in two types of legislation. It is concerned with laws to protect the economic and political rights of individual wage earners and of their organizations, and with legislation beneficially affecting industry or the economic structure. It is interested in social reform legislation, sometimes called labor legislation, only in so far as it is wholly subordinated to the two former types and not allowed to interfere with them in any way. Unfortunately it occurs altogether too often that this social-reform type of legislation is used precisely for such reactionary purposes.

Ewing Galloway

ALBERT THOMAS
Director of the International Labor Office at Geneva. M. Thomas was a member of a French war Cabinet

The conferences of the International Labor Office are composed of two representatives of each government, one of the *employers* and *one of the* workers of each country. At the outset governments determine the issue, or can if they will. Governments and employers are always a majority and of these the governments are two-thirds. At the outset it is a State machine. It continues as such. We can understand easily enough how this ideal of the State as the agency for everything prevails in Europe, but I think we shall continue in America to shun it as something so foreign to our ideals that we can regard it only as a menace to a free citizenry. We can rest assured that it was only under sheer compulsion and as an unavoidable compromise that Samuel Gompers ever gave his consent to such a voting arrangement.

Moreover, the program of legislation which inevitably develops once such an ideal is accepted is distinctly a State Socialist program working toward the State Socialist ideal. That it is accepted alike in dictatorial Italy and democratic Great Britain, ruled not by trade unions, but by a Socialist political body of which they are only a part, shows merely the subtle relation among all of the philosophies of the supremacy of the State as the agency through which to do all things, regardless of what economic structures or organizations control the State. It is not the contradiction that it may seem to those who examine superficially. However much it may blunder and abuse its opportunities, however far it may still be from its goal, the New World does stand for democracy, for

political and economic self-government, for voluntary action, against exaltation of the State as such. As long as this remains the situation, we may recognize in the International Labor Office an institution that may fit in with the policies of European labor, which has not yet altogether abandoned its traditional State Socialist policies, and a real aid to economic backward countries, which would prefer dictatorships forced to at least a minimum of reform by world opinion to dictatorships free from such beneficent pressure.

American labor, however, is not in the European predicament. While it advocates and welcomes certain parts of this social justice or "labor" legislation even in the United States, it regards such legislation, first, as being of practical value almost wholly because of the economic and political power of organized labor and not because of the benevolence of the State, and, second, it regards all such legislation as of entirely inferior importance compared to high wages, short hours, better conditions, steady employment, and the economic and political rights conquered and held, not by legislation in the first instance, but by economic organization and action, followed by such legislation as is necessary to make these particular gains effective. American labor, therefore, would be little disposed to enter into tripartite agreements with employers and governments, even if the dictators were excluded from the group. And especially it does not care to tie itself up in such an organization merely for what would tend to give, on the American field, an undesirable, an overshadowing and a fictitious importance to wholly secondary governmental acts.

There is no need to judge too harshly the International Labor Organization nor the International Labor Office, whose director is the energetic and enthusiastic Albert Thomas, veteran Socialist of France, and a consistent and loyal supporter of the labor unions of Europe. Under him there has been developed a splendid research organization, a magnificent library, a fine repository of information, perhaps unequaled. We have in Geneva a great agency for dragging facts into the light. There is a very high value, for example, in the successful efforts of the last International Labor Conference in focusing the attention of the world on the prevalence of forced labor in many countries. If only we could impose upon that foundation the philosophy of freedom, instead of the philosophy of exalting the State without regard to its con-

Building of the International Labor Office at Geneva, completed in 1926

trol or to the desirable limits of its functions!

Reference should also be made to the possibility that the International Labor Office may some day assume altogether more vital functions. European labor has been pointing, for example, to the fateful effect of international finance and international industrial enterprises on labor and to the whole range of international economic issues, every one of which affects labor. Up to the present such questions have been discussed, in the main, either by the International Economic Conference, called under the auspices of the League, or by the International Chamber of Commerce. It is obvious that these international economic relations and policies have an immensely greater effect on labor than all the social-reform legislation that exists or is being promulgated. Such questions obviously fall within the scope of the conferences of the International Labor Organization as originally proposed by the League. European labor steadily presses the International Labor Office in this direction in spite of the resistance of employers and governments. Since the International Labor Office will collapse morally any time that organized labor withdraws its support, the labor point of view has considerable weight and may some day conceivably prevail.

Even if the International Labor Office should radically alter its present functions, tendencies and policies in this direction, there would still remain its anomalous constitution, structure and organization. However, as previously indicated, since its structure is considerably modified by the moral influence and power of organized labor it remains an interesting subject of speculation, if desirable changes in the activities and policies should occur some day, whether American labor might find some way to assume a closer relation to the Geneva body. In view of the absence of the American Government at Geneva, definite American labor affiliation would still be out of question, even from the Geneva standpoint. But unofficial American labor observers might be useful to and be welcomed by the European labor contingent.

At its recent convention held in Toronto, Canada, the American Federation of Labor refused unanimously to take any action on a resolution calling for the "affiliation" of the Federation with the International Labor Office for the reason that the United States is not a member of the League of which the International Labor Office is a division. This convention also decided unanimously to take no action for the same reason on a resolution asking that "our government should have unofficial observers stationed in the International Labor Office at Geneva." Following this action, however, President Green referred pointedly to the fact that the late President Gompers had "firmly expected that some day the American Federation of Labor would be represented by an unofficial observer." Thus President Green foreshadowed the possibility of this form of American labor representation at Geneva at some future day. This day at present seems somewhat distant. Reference to this possibility is made, however, as not being too remote and as demonstrating, notwithstanding all reservations noted, the entire good-will and open-mindedness of American labor toward the International Labor Office.

Lobbies and American Legislation

By PETER H. ODEGARD
WILLIAMS COLLEGE, WILLIAMSTOWN, MASS.

THE CONSTITUTION has been supplanted," says William Allen White, "and we have two kinds of government—our political government * * * and a group of organized minorities * * * making a vast but tremendously powerful invisible government—the government of minorities." It is this invisible government which the late Senator Beveridge called "the real danger to American institutions." This government has recently become visible. The Senate has, so to speak, pulled the lid off the lobby.

On Aug. 21, 1929, William Baldwin Shearer, "American, Christian, Protestant, Nationalist," filed a complaint in the New York courts for $257,655 said to be due him from three American shipbuilding corporations for services as a propagandist, naval expert and lobbyist. "As a result of my activities during the Sixty-ninth Congress," said Mr. Shearer, "eight 10,000-ton cruisers are now under construction." The collapse of the Coolidge naval disarmament conference at Geneva in 1927 has been attributed to the efforts of this extraordinary man.

President Hoover, calling the attention of newspaper men to Shearer's suit, declared that "every American has the right to express his opinion and to engage in open propaganda if he wishes, but it is obviously against public interest for those who have financial interests in, or may be engaged in contracts for the construction of naval vessels, to attempt secretly to influence public opinion or public officials in favor of larger armaments or to attempt to defeat the efforts of governments in world limitation of such armaments or to employ persons for such purposes." The President's statement put Shearer on the front page, and within a week a Senate committee had been appointed to investigate.

Mr. Shearer's erstwhile employers testified that he had been paid $25,000 to go to Geneva solely as an impartial "observer," although none of them took the trouble to read his observations. It was admitted that he had been employed to lobby for the fifteen-cruiser bill of 1928-29, and that $143,000 had been spent on lobbying for the merchant marine act of 1928.

Almost immediately after the Shearer revelations came the news that Senator Hiram Bingham of Connecticut had hired Charles Eyanson of the Connecticut Manufacturers' Association to advise him on tariff rates. Eyanson had been placed on the payroll of the Senate and was thus enabled to attend secret sessions of the Finance Committee when considering tariff rates. Senator Bingham explained that as "Ambassador from Connecticut" he needed expert guidance on tariff matters so that the interests of "those who sent me here" would be protected. A sweeping investigation of all lobbyists in Washington was demanded, and a second committee was forthwith appointed to make the inquiry. On Nov. 4, by a vote of 54 to 22, the Senate censured Senator Bingham for conduct "contrary to good morals and Senatorial ethics."

Senator Caraway, in a bill to regulate lobbying, defines a lobbyist as "one who shall, whether for pay or otherwise, attempt to influence legislation or to prevent legislation by the National Congress." So defined, lobbyists are an ancient and familiar breed.

Manaseh Cutler, lobbyist for the newly established Ohio Company in

1787, secured a land grant from Congress of over 4,000,000 acres. The Yazoo land companies in 1795 bribed an entire Legislature, and in 1805 employed the Postmaster General of the United States as Congressional lobbyist.

RAILROAD INFLUENCE

The slave-holders ruled the nation for forty years. After the Civil War the railroads ascended the throne. "The Southern Pacific party," says Professor Oberholtzer, "with John C. Frémont at its head, was a candidate with the Northern Pacific for the patronage of the government. . . . Henry Cooke, Wilkerson, William E. Chandler and a host whom they employed got behind the Northern Pacific bill with all the weight of their broad experience in political management." The Governors of Minnesota and Pennsylvania, the officers of the railroads and even James G. Blaine, the "Plumed Knight," acted as lobbyists. In April, 1870, Henry Cooke wrote to his brother: "Blaine is doing us great service. . . . We have the bill in such shape that all the business of the House is suspended until it passes." In the days of Crédit Mobilier, "Sam" Ward, "King of the Lobby," made his headquarters in the rooms of the Appropriations Committee or at Chamberlain's restaurant, where he entertained "half-convinced members of Congress."

Describing a session of the Thirty-ninth Congress, Claude Bowers writes: "Agents of interests seeking special governmental favors were swarming lobbies and corridors." Railroad lobbyists were described as sitting in the "galleries, looking down on the scene like beasts of prey." In April, 1869, the *North American Review* said: "A network of rings controls Congress and forms a hedge which marks the limit within which argument and reason may prevail." The story is told that Senator J. S. Morrill once called the Senate's attention to the fact that the president of the Pennsylvania Railroad was in the lobby and "ironically offered the motion that a committee be appointed to wait on him and learn whether there was any further legislation he desired before they adjourned."

When tariff legislation is to be considered lobbyists representing everything from agar-agar to zinc swarm into Washington. "Since 1875," says Henry Loomis Nelson, "Congress has not legislated on the tariff. It has merely affirmed or ratified the decrees of the beneficiaries of the tariff."

President Wilson in 1913 called attention to the extensive lobbying on behalf of interests seeking tariff protection. The Congressional investigation which followed disclosed that the National Council for Industrial Defense had spent $1,500,000 in six years to promote legislation and mold public opinion. The sugar trust had spent $750,000 fighting the Cuban reciprocity treaty. A Boston woolen manufacturer, it was said, wrote the wool schedule, and a cotton manufacturer of Rhode Island acted as "expert" adviser to Senator Aldrich. The letters of Martin Mulhall, agent of the National Association of Manufacturers, revealed a campaign of propaganda and pressure reaching into nearly every State.

Wide World

WILLIAM B. SHEARER

The present investigation unfolds a similar tale. Ten American sugar companies with holdings in Cuba have expended close to $100,000 this year on a campaign to reduce the tariff on sugar. The United States Beet Sugar Association, on the other hand, has spent, since 1921, over $500,000 to prevent any lowering of sugar rates. J. A. Arnold told the committee that the Southern Tariff Association spends $50,000 a year for lobbying, and that the expenditures of the American Taxpayers' League, of which he is manager, amount to between $150,000 and $250,000 annually.

For thirty years City Councils, State Legislatures and Congresses, Mayors, Governors and Presidents felt the heavy hand of the temperance lobby. The Webb-Kenyon act, the Eighteenth Amendment, the Volstead act, as well as countless other national, State and local laws, were virtually written in the offices of the Anti-Saloon League.

Fighting the drys at every step were the liquor interests. In ten years the Texas Brewers' Association spent $1,000,000 fighting temperance legislation, and in four years the United States Brewers' Association collected over $4,000,000 for political purposes.

There, now, I've got my house in order again
The New York Times

THE "FARM BLOC"

The American Farm Bureau Federation organized the "farm bloc" in Congress, which from 1921 to 1923 held the balance of power. The federation continues to speak in stentorian tones on all legislation affecting agriculture. The soldiers' bonus act of 1924 was largely the work of the American Legion. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States played an important rôle in the enactment of the Federal Reserve act, the national budget act, the transportation act of 1920 and the Federal water power act. The public utilities have banded together to fight government ownership and to protect themselves from "hostile" legislation. The National Electric Light Association in one year collected over $1,000,000 for these purposes.

There are between 500 and 1,000 such organizations with permanent offices in Washington. There are the American Bankers Association and the Hod Carriers' Union, the Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Ku Klux Klan, the Lord's Day Alliance and the Association Opposed to Blue Laws, the Methodist Board of Temperance, Prohibition and Public Morals, and the Catholic Welfare Conference. The women are represented by thirty separate organizations; thirteen speak for trade and industry; ten for agriculture; eight for labor and ten for the professions. Twenty reform groups advocate everything from better babies to bigger battleships. Many exist for the sole purpose of paying salaries to their officers,

while others are represented by men and women, with a zeal for something or other, who donate their services. One lobbyist is reputed to receive $75,000 a year, but the salaries of most are modest. Wayne Wheeler, generalissimo of the drys, received a salary of $8,000 and died a poor man. Ex-Congressmen and Senators and ex-administrative officials are frequently retained. Ex-Senator Lenroot of Wisconsin and former Representative Frank Mondell have served as lobbyists; William Burgess, a former member of the Tariff Commission, receives $7,500 a year as lobbyist for the United States Pottery Association.

A big slump in "National Confidence Common"
Detroit News

The constituency which these agents represent varies from a mere handful to millions. The Chamber of Commerce has an underlying membership of 850,000 corporations, firms and individuals; the American Farm Bureau Federation claims to speak for 1,500,000 families, and the Anti-Saloon League represents in the neighborhood of 30,000 churches. The weaker sisters claim an influence almost wholly mythical. But a warning or suggestion from one of the "big fellows" may be as effective as an order from the White House.

Lobbying is not confined to the national capital. Until quite recent times it was the fashion to speak of certain States as "belonging" to the railroads. Thus New York was the happy hunting ground of the New York Central; in Pennsylvania the Pennsylvania Railroad ruled the roost; the Southern Pacific, like a giant octopus, spread its tentacles over the Capitol dome in California.

The New York insurance investigation of 1906 laid bare a lobby of nationwide extent. In December, 1928, Governor-elect Reed of Kansas wrote: "The corporation lobby has begun early this year. It has already had a big booze party at one of the principal hotels in Topeka. At this party were eight State Senators, four railroad attorneys, representatives of the Bell Telephone Company and other public utility and corporation representatives. At this party were discussed committee assignments in the Senate and plans for opposing the incoming administration."

Last year more than 40 legislative agents were present in Albany during the legislative session; in Massachusetts 77 were registered. At a recent session in California 127 lobbyists were on hand, and in 1925 in Ohio 170 were registered.

Nor does lobbying stop at the State Legislatures. The Mayor, City Council and School Board unceasingly feel the pressure of civic and trade associations, taxpayers' leagues, labor unions, teachers' federations and [illegible] ganizations. [illegible] sion that as a

Most lobbyists are [illegible] them to work political creeds a[illegible] substitute for deso long as th[illegible] this time ac-

Associated Press

SENATOR HIRAM BINGHAM

They contribute to campaign funds. "In Republican States," said Mr. Havemeyer of the sugar trust in 1894, "we contribute to the Republicans, and in Democratic States to the Democrats. [And in doubtful States] we contribute to both sides." As Jay Gould once expressed it, the Erie Railroad was "for the Democrats in Democratic counties in New York; for the Republicans in Republican counties; but at all times and places for the Erie Railroad." Joseph Grundy, president of the Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association, raised $600,000 for the Republicans in 1924 and between $700,000 and $1,000,000 in 1928. It is not unnatural for those who pay the piper to insist upon calling the tune.

THE TARIFF ISSUE

Candidates are supported or opposed [illegible] Republicans or Democrats but [illegible] tariff men, as wets or [illegible]n or pacifists, friends There, now, I've gr. Ninety-five per [illegible] the Southern Tariff Association, a highly protectionist organization, are Democrats. "Down there," says J. A. Arnold, general manager, "they are protectionists first and partisans second."

Supplying members of legislative bodies with information is an important part of the lobbyist's work. The Congressional Library and the Legislative Reference Bureau are, of course, at the service of Congressmen. But the resources of the bureau are limited, and few of our Representatives are trained in habits of independent research. Many legislators feel that to consult the administrative departments is to violate the American principle of separation of powers, and they are suspicious of executive guidance In actual practice the chief burden of supplying information falls to the lobbyists.

That such information is, in most cases, biased goes without saying. The most powerful ally the lobbyist has is the ignorance of those who make the laws. Shearer's reputation as a naval expert depended, according to his own testimony, not so much "on my own ability but on the lack of knowledge of naval affairs shown by Congress."

Supplying information, preparing bills for introduction, arguing before committees, "talking things over" with individual members—these are only a few of the lobbyist's duties. "Back of all such endeavor," says a veteran lobbyist, "there must be * * * public opinion voicing itself in a way that will be heard by every Congressman."

FLOODS OF TELEGRAMS

Much time and money is spent to arouse the "folks back home" to send letters, telegrams, petitions and memorials to their Representatives demanding that they vote in a particular way. One Anti-Saloon League official in 1917 boasted that he had personally seen to the sending of 900 such telegrams in a single day. Petitions were presented by the league in 1913 from 9,296 organizations; one petition contained 6,000,000 names. During consideration of the Kellogg treaty, United States Senators received 10,000 resolu-

ions from women's organizations urging ratification. In the colorful language of Lemuel Ely Quigg, the lobbyist becomes an "accelerator" of public opinion.

Pressure on Employes

The following letter sent to the employes of the Great Western Sugar Company at Longmont, Col., on May 2, 1913, speaks for itself:

> You have heard so much of the tariff bill and its probable effect on our industry that many of you think, no doubt, that it is only a scare, and that the sugar company will not be hurt by it. * * *
>
> If the bill, as it has been passed by the House of Representatives, should be passed by the United States Senate * * * not more than two or three of our nine factories could be operated, and you all know also that idle factories mean idle men.
>
> As employes of the company interested in keeping the factories in operation, will you not each one write a letter to the Hon. Charles S. Thomas, United States Senate and the Hon. John F. Shafroth United States Senate, Washington, D. C., asking that they use their influence to have the 'free sugar in three years' clause eliminated in the tariff bill."
>
> Your letter will have just as much influence with those gentlemen as any letter they will receive, and we would ask that you show your interest in the State at large as well as the company you are working for by doing this *advising the head of your department when you have written this letter.* [Italics McCreary's.] If you are a Democrat and will so state in your letter it will carry even more weight * * *
>
> Very truly yours,
>
> N. R. McCreary, Manager.

Associated Press

JOSEPH R. GRUNDY

Associated Press

CHARLES L. EYANSON

The power companies have displayed considerable ingenuity in "accelerating" public opinion. A recent letter of the president of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company says:

> We discovered the country bankers quite a number of years ago. * * *
>
> We came to the conclusion that as a practical inducement to get them to work with us there is no substitute for deposits. * * * We have at this time ac-

counts with 230 country banks scattered all over our territory. * * * *Incidentally, we require no interest on these deposits.* [Italics mine.]

We have had occasion to test their friendliness on a number of occasions, and they have never failed us. During our two big campaigns against the so-called water and power act they literally sent out hundreds of thousands of personal letters and pieces of literature * * * as well as campaigning against the act personally.

Delegations are brought to the capital to meet the legislators face to face. For one hearing on a local option bill in Maryland it required two trains of twenty-two cars to carry the Anti-Saloon League crowd to Annapolis. During the hearings on the Fordney-McCumber tariff the corridors leading to the Finance Committee were "so filled with lobbyists that it was almost impossible for an outside Senator to get to the committee room." The American Taxpayers' League, American Bankers' League and the Council of State Legislatures paid the expenses of 150 delegates who descended upon the Ways and Means Committee in 1927 to urge repeal of the Federal estate tax.

Practically all these groups engage in propaganda to "educate" the public. From 1915 to 1917 the Anti-Saloon League was spending about $2,500,000 annually—most of it on propaganda. At times there were as many as 20,000 "dry" speakers in the field. From October, 1909, to January, 1923, the league's printing establishment turned out over 157,000,000 copies of temperance papers and 240,000,000 books, pamphlets and leaflets. Through the cooperation of friendly members of Congress propaganda [illegible] often read into the Congressional Record and later sent through the mail under the Congressman's "frank." For instance, "Sugar at a Glance," by Truman Palmer of the A[illegible]rican Beet Sugar Association, was [illegible] a Senate document and 320,- [illegible]ments o[illegible] [illegible]ent through the mails at such purposes." [illegible]nse. The lobby investi- [illegible]vealed that 1,700,000 such "documents" had been "franked" to all parts of the United States.

Through national and State committees the public utilities have flooded the country with propaganda. Whereas the drys put temperance physiology books in the hands of school children, the power companies have introduced their own brand of economics and civics texts. In the schools of Illinois, Ohio, Missouri, Connecticut and Washington these "doctored" books have been extensively used. Speakers go up and down the land addressing Rotary, Kiwanis and women's clubs, civic associations, chambers of commerce and schools. In one year 10,000 such talks were made to 1,500,000 people.

Use of Poor Newspapers

With about $28,000,000 a year to spend on advertising, the utilities are in a position to influence newspaper policy. "Canned" news and editorials are supplied to the pauper press. The Ohio committee sends out 4,000 bulletins in every mail and boasts that in 1926 over 20,000 column inches of news and 150 editorials written by utility press agents were printed in Ohio newspapers. Nine hundred papers receive the bulletins of the Illinois committee and in Indiana John Mellet succeeded in getting nearly 35,000 column inches of "utility news" in the papers of that State. The power companies subsidized the E. C. Hofer & Sons agency of Salem, Ore., to the extent of $84,000 a year. This agency with 14,000 newspaper clients secured in four years the equivalent of 65,526 *pages* of newspaper space for the utilities.

The publicity office of General Sugars, Inc., calls itself the "All States News Bureau" and has expended $24,000 this year. Its "releases" are used by 700 newspapers and 1,800 editorial writers throughout the country. The National City Company of New York, which holds all the stock of General Sugars, sends to 300,000 depositors and others a bulletin advocating lower sugar duties.

A word should be said concerning

the so-called "social lobby." "Over candles flickering on flowers and silver," says Senator Kenyon, "over rare linens and rich viands, it is suggested which is the best way to vote. No one ever makes a frank demand—it is merely understood. If he refuses, he finds himself an outcast—if he votes right, he belongs to the amiable inner circle." Congressmen who aspire to bask in the effulgent light of Washington society must vote right or be ostracized. It is agreed, however, by those familiar with conditions in Washington that the influence of the social lobby is on the wane. Senator Thomas Walsh calls it "a myth."

What shall be done about the lobbies? The demand for some regulation has been repeatedly made, but thus far Congress has not seen fit to legislate on the matter. Thirty-two States have such laws. On the whole, they have been ineffective since little or no effort is made to enforce them.

Can an effective Federal law be devised? In the first place such a law should so define lobbying as to include all persons who in any way attempt to influence legislation. It should require a statement of income and expenditures at fairly short intervals, the disclosure of the agent's employer and the measures in which he is interested. Above all there must be provision for some regular scrutiny of these reports by an authorized agent of the government who should in turn report to Congress. Penalties should include disbarment of persons who violate the act from further service as lobbyists. Compensation which is contingent upon the passage or defeat of legislation should be prohibited, and the "privilege of the floor" should be denied to ex-Congressmen employed as lobbyists.

What about propaganda? A democracy cannot afford to resort to censorship. The twin rights of association and advocacy are fundamental, and any government which seeks to repress or seriously restrict them soon dies in dictatorship. Propagandist agencies might be required to label their "literature." But even this will not remove the temptation from editors who find it easy and economical to fill their columns with such material or from educators who through poverty, ignorance or inertia allow it to be used in the schools.

Effect of Two-Party System

Our political parties are not designed to give effective representation to the divergent viewpoints present in the body of our citizenry. We cannot in reason hope to force all people into the Procrustean bed of a two-party system. The lobbying of religious groups, both Catholic and Protestant, is a case in point. If the State is an instrument for the promotion of the good life surely the churches have vital interests to protect and promote. When the regular parties fail them, they turn to the methods of "pressure politics."

Lobbying is not peculiar to the United States, although it is more highly evolved here than in Europe. On the Continent numerous political parties more nearly represent the various interests in the community. In Parliamentary countries, where the power to initiate legislation is lodged in a responsible executive, direct pressure on private members of legislative bodies is futile. Where the government seeks to foster and promote private business through such legislation as a protective tariff and where the private member has a hand in its formulation lobbying is inevitable. The localism characteristic of American politics makes it easier to exert outside pressure and for Congress to become a "convention of local envoys."

It is useless to bewail the existence of lobbies. Through them the individual often attains his only true representation. Public opinion is king but public opinion in any other sense than organized group opinion is a phantom. What we most imperatively need at the present moment is to turn the searchlight of publicity upon the methods which these groups employ and to let legislators and administrators know for whom and by what right the lobbyist speaks.

Woodrow Wilson as an Undergraduate

By C. L. WILLIAMS
PROFESSOR EMERITUS OF ENGLISH LITERATURE, DENISON UNIVERSITY, GRANVILLE, OHIO

THOMAS WOODROW WILSON entered Princeton College as a freshman in the Autumn of 1875 and graduated in June, 1879, and it was fitting that on Dec. 11, 1929, the fiftieth anniversary of his graduation should be celebrated with appropriate ceremonies at Princeton University. Speakers of national prominence delivered eloquent addresses on this occasion; among them Robert Bridges, and Dr. Garfield of Williams College.

It is interesting to go back to the days when Woodrow Wilson was a student at Princeton. All the time he was an undergraduate he was a young man of correct habits. He not only did not drink intoxicating liquors, as did quite a few Princeton students in those days, but he abstained entirely from the use of tobacco, even from cigarettes, then become fashionable. He was an active and useful member of the Philadelphian Society, a religious organization under the control of the students, though he was not extravagantly religious nor a moral pedant. He was not disagreeably good. He had a redeeming fault or two. For one thing, he had a temper, an able-bodied one, but he did not often lose control of it.

Woodrow Wilson had a just sense of his personal worth, and so he was without conceit, and on the other hand he was without the modesty which is only egotism turned wrong side out. He was a gentleman, not an amateur gentleman but an instinctive one, developed in the best society of the South, and was accepted as such by other gentlemen. While in college he roomed alone, most of the time in Witherspoon Hall, then the newest and handsomest of the college dormitories, but he was by no means a cold-blooded recluse. He knew, and he acted as if he knew it, that a young man in college is himself plus his intimate associates, and that he may receive as many intellectual nudges in the right direction from some of his fellow-students as from some of his professors.

"We soon found out that he had an eager mind," writes Robert Bridges, one of his classmates, now the veteran editor of *Scribner's Magazine*. "But there was not a touch of the pedant or dig about him. He was as keen for the life of the college as any one of us; but we soon discovered that what he called the 'play of the mind' was as exhilarating to him as the play of the body to the athlete. He took great pleasure in the writers who used language with precision and with imagination. To him this was not a scholastic pursuit. It was full of the stuff of existence. He would trail a word or phrase with that eagerness that R. L. S. so exalted. They would pop out in his conversation at the club table as a part of a jest or a noisy dispute. There was a twinkle in his eye, but he knew, and you knew, that he had scored. It was as natural for him as an undergraduate to talk Burke, Brougham or Bagehot as for the rest of us to allude to Cooper or Mayne Reid. We soon found out that the thing he was most interested in (to which this play of words was accessory) was government. Now that sounds abstract and dull. To him it

meant the evolution of a method by which all kinds of people could live together in the same country and same world. For him it began in our little college world with its coteries. He soon had around him a group of fellows who could play the game of Hall or club politics with the skill of practiced parliamentarians. It did not interfere with the fun of athletic contests and it certainly added to the zest of college life. Through his initiative, they followed the rules of the British Parliament and if you could not uphold your contention in debate, you were overthrown as a Prime Minister is in Great Britain. Of that little coterie one became Attorney General of New Jersey, another Chancellor and later Justice of the United States Supreme Court, another Mayor of his city and Congressman from an important district, and one Governor of New Jersey and President of the United States."

Wilson was not only self-respecting but his self-respect went hand in hand with what was worthy of respect in others. He was polite and yet he did not hobnob with everybody. He had a smile that was pleasant, and one could not help believing it was a truthful smile, an honest reflection of the pleased feeling he had at the time, but Wilson was not "the most popular man in college," although he had a number of enriching friendships, especially among his classmates. He enjoyed fellowship, and those with tastes and aspirations akin to his own found him a very companionable young man. One reason for this was that he was a good talker, a fruitful talker, when in a company made up of those with whom he felt at home. He had a broad intelligence, a vivid temperament and a steady command of choice English. He was not a young man of wavering opinions or slanting convictions, but quite the reverse, for his mother was Scotch and his father Scotch-Irish. He was not without the quality of self-certitude, and yet he was an indulgent listener to the talk of others, even when it concerned themselves more than it did any one else.

He had the gift of clever repartee. Besides, he could rightly size up a student nobody liked and deliver an estimate of him as sharp as it was true. To illustrate: There was a young man in college who had a fondness for poking into the private affairs of others. He did this to such an extent he made a nuisance of himself, and so Wilson said of him: "We used to read in *Julius Caesar* that all Gaul was divided into three parts, but it seems this young man's gall has never been divided nor diminished in the least."

He was familiarly called "Tommy" Wilson, but he had about him an air of dignity very becoming to him as it would have been to any one else. It was not the outgrowth of egotism, which is always very touchy. It was not what George Eliot calls "frigid mincingness." It was not the kind those having it always stand on, which perhaps is the best thing they could do with it stand on it as one would stand on a heap of shavings but Wilson's dignity was of the valid sort. It was the flowering out of wholesome self-respect. It was so flexible he could bend without breaking and stoop without falling. He, therefore, did not have to lay his dignity aside in order to be amusing.

He would never take a hand in such extra-curriculum activities as "appro-

Designed by Vincent S. Wickham

Medal commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Wilson's graduation, celebrated in December, 1929

priating for private uses" the clapper of the college bell in the tower of Old North, as was occasionally done, and thus prevent the summoning of students to recitations and to chapel for religious services, which were held twice every weekday except Saturday, but Wilson was so entirely human he liked fun as well as the next one. He made others laugh and laugh heartily, but without causing the slightest shrinkage in their respect for him, because they laughed not so much at him as at what he had said. He himself was no joke when he told one.

He took an active interest in all that went on among the students. More than this. In college as well as during the rest of his life he was a crusader for what he thought was right. He had a passion for reform. This was revealed, for instance, in a very important contribution which as a sophomore he made to *The Princetonian,* one of the two student publications in college. He criticized in a pungent but gentlemanly way the idea of oratory then prevalent in Princeton. He showed wherein he believed it to be entirely wrong, and he not only pointed out how it might be corrected but why this ought to be done. During his last year in college he was rated the most effective debater in Whig Hall, the literary and debating society to which he belonged, but he would never for any reason enter a debate to argue for what he did not believe in with all his mind and heart. He would not trifle with his sense of truth in that way. He was also a very good extempore speaker, being agreeably fluent both as to well-chosen ideas and well-chosen words.

With a few unfortunate exceptions, the students of Princeton in those days were deeply interested in athletics. Although the Apostle Paul said, "Bodily exercise profiteth little," the most of them wanted to acquire that "little." A number of them who were excellent in their college studies and who, after leaving college, achieved unusual distinction in professional life were members of teams or clubs representing Princeton in intercollegiate athletics, but Wilson was not one of them. He was interested in athletics and was president of the baseball association at one time, but he was far away from specializing in physical education. Indeed,

From *Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters*, Doubleday Page, 1927

THE ALLIGATOR CLUB

Wilson's eating club at Princeton. He is seen, hat in hand, third from the right

one of the mistakes he made as a student in Princeton was that he did not take more pains to develop a thoroughly robust physique, for this would have stood him in excellent stead during the strenuous years of his public life.

Wilson's outstanding characteristic in college was his independence. He would never go with the crowd unless it happened to be going his way, and yet he did not disagree with others merely because it gave him pleasure to do so. He would not stand apart from the multitude simply to draw attention to himself. He had too much self-respect for that, but if honesty with himself demanded it, he would stand alone and firmly so, and his independence revealed itself particularly in his view of what he owed to himself as a student.

Education has been described as "the direction or guidance of growth," and early in his college course Wilson made up his mind to direct his own growth, doing this from loyalty to himself and not from vanity. He aspired always and solely to achieve self-discipline, self-culture and the well-rounded development of the best there was in him. As he believed he knew himself better than any one else did, he decided for himself the direction in which he would bend his energies the most as a student.

The Princeton faculty then numbered nearly thirty, and taken as a whole was a body of strong men. It included only about three "feeble members," men of threadbare minds, stale scholarship and without a kindling personality. One of these, an amiable man to meet in his home or on the street, was a very dull lecturer. Indeed, it almost seemed as if he had reduced dullness to the precision of a science, for while lecturing to a class he would part with his ideas, but often during the latter part of the hour he would continue to part with his ideas without at the same time imparting them to many in the class because they were soundly asleep! Such a professor, however, was negatively useful to those in his classes like Wilson, who were to become teachers, because he was a forcible example of

This photograph of Woodrow Wilson was taken in 1879, his senior year at Princeton.

what they might well determine not to be when they themselves were teachers, and so in a way and to some extent Wilson's dull professors, no doubt without knowing it, helped to make him the brilliant professor he later became at Princeton.

Like many other young men in those days, Wilson's principal reason for coming to Princeton College was that he might be a student under Dr James McCosh, who was not only president but the Professor of Psychology and the History of Philosophy. Dr McCosh was an acute thinker. He was also a clear thinker, with the gift of lucid statement. Besides, he had the courage to welcome truth even though it came from sources generally considered unorthodox. Though a loyal Presbyterian, he was one of the first clergymen in this country to defend the theory of evolution. He was a conservative, with an open, not a closed, mind, and so he had a firm hold on the respect

and admiration of open-minded and thoughtful students. Wilson was one of them, and he reacted richly to the influence of Dr. McCosh as a teacher. For one thing, Wilson was made to feel as he had never felt before, that truth is the safest thing in the world. Besides, he was confirmed in his acceptance of the evolutionary theory, with all that implies as to intelligent and liberal thinking.

The class of '79, to which Wilson belonged, was the largest that up till then had ever entered Princeton, and in every way it was one of the best that ever sang "in praise of Old Nassau." The class had weight as well as numbers. Wilson was bright and worked hard, and so it would seem as if his name ought to have appeared on the honor roll of his class, but it never did, and when he graduated he stood forty-first in a class of 122. One reason why he did not rank any higher was that he did not seem to care a fig about grades as such. He aspired to do something far more worthy of a rational young man than strain himself all the time and to the point of perspiration simply to merit high grades for his college work, as did a few in those days, but who, after leaving college, never won anything higher in the way of honor than their high grades in college, and whose diploma became a memento of departed glory. Wilson did very well in those studies, both elective and required, which fitted well into his idea of self-culture, but those required studies which did not do this he pursued with only a small degree of success, and this was another reason why he ranked no higher in his class. Besides, he spent a great deal of time and energy in work which was not offered in the college curriculum, but which he did in fulfillment of his purpose to preside over his own development.

This work, as Mr. Bridges has told us, had mainly to do with the history, the politics and the parliamentary system of Great Britain. Wilson believed the British had solved the problem of constitutional government better than any other people. He was a disciple of Gladstone, Edmund Burke, John Bright and Walter Bagehot. He received no specific credit for his work in the college registrar's office, but during his last year in college the fruitage of his extra-curriculum studies, or at least a part of it, appeared in a brilliant article of his on "Cabinet Government in the United States," in which he pointed out why he believed the cabinet government in the British Parliamentary system was better than the committee government of our American Congress. This article was accepted by the editor of the *International Review*, a publication then of the highest repute. When the article was published it attracted considerable attention throughout this country and was looked upon as a remarkable piece of work for a young man of 22, as Wilson then was. This was an honor most students would rather have won than the honor of graduating at the head of their class, and in Wilson's case it was prophetic of still greater honors.

President Wilson's Bookplate

Georges Clemenceau

By PHILIP CARR
PARIS CORRESPONDENT FOR THE LONDON *Observer*

GEORGES CLEMENCEAU, one of the outstanding figures in the political life of the world in the last generation and head of France's "Victory Cabinet" during the last year of the war, died in Paris on Nov. 24, 1929, at the age of 88 years. The following day he was, according to his wishes, buried privately in a little wood beside the village of Colombier near Roche-sur-Yon in the Vendée. Full and appropriate public honors, however, were paid to his memory by heads of States, governments, legations and other bodies throughout the world. In Paris one of the ceremonies of special significance was held at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier beneath the Arc de Triomphe, before which, in the presence of President Doumergue, members of the government and dignitaries of all kinds, war veterans filed past, associating on this occasion the names of the Unknown Soldier and Clemenceau in the public memory.

Clemenceau was born on Sept. 28, 1841, in a little house belonging to his mother's family at Mouileron-en-Pareds (which means paradise in the local dialect of the Western Vendee countryside). On his father's side he came of a family who had been village doctors for several generations, but on his mother's he was of peasant origin. His father was not only a doctor, but he believed in and transmitted to his son that passionate republicanism which elevates the French Revolution into little less than a religion. In 1851 he had already been interned for sedition, and after the Orsini attempt on Napoleon's life he was arrested and imprisoned. "I will avenge you," said his son Georges. "Then work," was the father's laconic reply.

At 18 Clemenceau began to study medicine in Paris, which, for the remainder of his life, remained the centre of his thoughts, his dreams and his activity. At 21, he founded his first newspaper, *Le Travail*, in which he wrote not only political articles, but dramatic criticism, and it was in connection with the first performance of *Gaetana* by the reactionary Edmond About that he was imprisoned for "proclaiming the Republic" from the table of a cafe. In 1865 began his years of wandering. He crossed to England, and visited John Stuart Mill, whose *Auguste Comte and Positivism* he translated later. Indeed, it was to Positivism that his considered opinion and very free thought on religious matters ultimately bore the closest relation. He crossed to the United States, and in New York was for a time correspondent of *Le Temps* of Paris. He became professor of French literature in a girls' school in Connecticut and there fell in love with one of his pupils, the orphan Mary Plummer. It was long before he could persuade her guardian to consent to a civil marriage, and in the meanwhile he paid a visit to France, but he returned in 1870, married the lady (from whom he was eventually separated) and took her back to France just in time to leave her with his parents in the Vendee whilst he threw himself into the whirlpool of affairs in Paris.

He practiced as a doctor in Montmartre. When the Franco-Prussian War broke out in 1870 it was impossible that any sincere Republican should desire immediate success for Louis Napoleon's flamboyant policy. But, once the empire was beaten at Sedan, the patriot which Clemenceau had al-

ways been could work without scruple for the defense of France. The empire fell like a pack of cards and the republic was proclaimed. Clemenceau's old friend, Etienne Arago, became Mayor of Paris and nominated Clemenceau as Mayor of Montmartre. There, in a short time, he accomplished wonders of practical organization. He established secular schools, and incidentally became associated with that strangely passionate and devoted revolutionary figure, Louise Michel, then a young school teacher.

THE COMMUNE OF 1871

In March, 1871, when France was defeated by the Germans and all was lost, he was sent as a delegate to the National Assembly at Bordeaux, and there he was one of those few, like Victor Hugo and Gambetta, who joined the Deputies of Alsace and Lorraine and signed the protest by which they refused to vote for the cession of those provinces to Germany. He returned to Paris in time for the early struggles of the Commune, and it was then that occurred the famous incident of the guns of Montmartre. They had been subscribed and paid for by the National Guard and had successfully escaped seizure by the Germans; but they were now taken by the French reactionaries and only recovered after a struggle, in the course of which Generals Lecomte and Thomas were placed against a wall and shot by the people. Clemenceau, though he had no sympathy for them, risked his own life in trying to save theirs. This courage cost him the animosity of the Commune, which accused him of being himself reactionary. A young Brazilian who resembled him was captured and was about to be shot when the mistaken identity was discovered. Clemenceau himself had to leave Paris. He found a few days for a flying visit to his father's Château de l'Aubraie to see his wife and new-born child; but most of his time was spent in touring the country and making speeches on behalf of [illegible] and republican principles. This [illegible]ly did not please Thiers, whose policy was to fish in troubled reactionary waters, and it was consequently not until 1876 that Clemenceau returned to an active part in national politics. However, he filled in the time most usefully by becoming a member of the new Municipal Council of Paris in 1871 and eventually its president in 1875.

In 1876 he was elected to the National Assembly for one of the districts of Paris as a thorough-going Republican and took his seat on the extreme Left, under Gambetta. When MacMahon's attempt at a reactionary *coup d'état* was defeated, Clemenceau tried hard to persuade Gambetta to lead the government, but the latter contented himself with the post of President of the Chamber, and, as he became more and more opportunist and retired from the active battle to the background, Clemenceau came to be regarded as the acknowledged leader of the Radical Left. As a leader he was intrepid, inspiring and passionately just.

From this time, however, his political activity began to acquire the character, which it retained for many years, of being critical and destructive in preference to cooperating in the practical work of administration. Scrupulously fair, he argued in favor of the amnesty of the Communists, though they had tried to shoot him. He was devotedly and sternly a Republican in principle, and he even forsook his old leader Gambetta when that leader appeared to be aiming at personal power. On principle he opposed the *scrutin de liste* as being undemocratic, opposed the creation of a Senate and the compromise which was represented by the constitution of 1875. Yet it was only by negative criticism that he was willing to give effect to these principles. Before he formed a Ministry himself he had been directly responsible [illegible] the fall of eighteen Ministries. Th[illegible] he acquired the nickname of *Le T[illegible]eur*, which was perhaps better su[illegible] to his political character than the [illegible]ter known Tiger, for nothing so [illegible] and unprincipled as the tiger ever [illegible]resented Clemenceau's action. He [illegible]

GEORGES CLEMENCEAU

by bringing down Gambetta. He brought down Jules Ferry. He brought down Grévy as President of the republic. Indeed, with regard to that high office, he acquired a specialty not merely of inducing the holders to resign but of securing the election of the candidates whom he favored. Carnot, Loublet and Fallières were each in turn his candidate. It was perhaps the fact that Poincaré's election represented almost his first failure in choosing the President of the republic, which accounted for the animosity between the two men when cooperation and mutual advice might have led to so much wisdom at the time of the Peace Conference, with one as President of the republic and the other as Prime Minister.

Boulanger's Offer

In 1880 Clemenceau founded *Justice,* in collaboration with Camille Pelletan. Through this paper during the next five years Clemenceau influenced the politics of the country. In 1885 he was returned to the Chamber of Deputies for the Southern Department of the Var, and in his paper and in the Chamber he waged relentless war against the reactionary Boulanger, although Boulanger invited him to join his projected *coup d'état* as Prime Minister, with himself as Minister of War. Though a silent and unforgetting patriot, he combated the flamboyant patriotism of Déroulède and eventually fought a duel with him. This was in connection with the Panama scandal, in which attempts were made to involve the honesty of Clemenceau, because in the early days of *Justice* Cornelius Herz had been accepted as a shareholder. Clemenceau combatted the proposed Russian alliance, which he regarded as undemocratic for a country with France's revolutionary record and also as likely to lessen the chance of an understanding with Great Britain, which Clemenceau, with the interest of France solely at heart, always regarded as the right objective. He never lost a chance of fighting the influence of clericalism and of pointing out the anti-republican attitude of the heads of the Catholic Church. He combatted Jules Ferry's great schemes of colonial expansion in the East and brought them to naught, for he believed that it was France's duty first to concentrate her forces nearer home.

All these antagonisms resulted in Clemenceau's losing his Parliamentary seat in the elections in 1893, and at the age of fifty-two it seemed that his political career was at an end. For several years he devoted himself to literature, until the Dreyfus case brought him back into the front line of politics. In 1897 he left *Justice* to become the principal writer on *L'Aurore,* in the columns of which he conducted the magnificent campaign which resulted in the revision of the Dreyfus trial. At first he had believed Dreyfus guilty, and had said so in scathing terms. Even when he became sure that the trial had been irregular and ought to be revised, he did not yet believe Dreyfus innocent. M. Scheurer-Kestner, a distinguished Alsatian, eventually convinced Clemenceau of the innocence of the accused, and from that time, though

no friend of the Jews, he worked wholeheartedly for the revision. With the courageous collaboration of Zola, of Jaurès and Picquart, that revision was finally secured.

Becoming Senator for the Var, in 1902, Clemenceau supported the Combes Ministry in its enactments with regard to secular education, the obligation upon the religious congregations to become legalized secular associations, and eventually the separation of Church and State. In 1906, for the first time in his career, he assumed executive responsibility, as Minister for the Interior under Sarrien in a Cabinet which included Bourgeois, Poincare, Briand and Barthou, and later in the same year he formed his first government with a Ministry of much the same composition, but without Bourgeois, Poincaré and Delcasse (who had resigned at the dictation of Germany) and with Caillaux as Minister of Finance, Viviani in the newly created Ministry of Labor and Picquart as Minister of War. This government was probably the most radical that had ever taken office under the republic, and it lasted longer than any since the fall of the empire. It would have been memorable if only for the passing of Caillaux's income-tax proposals.

Attitude on Strikes

Clemenceau, however, while Minister of the Interior under Sarrien and during his own government, managed to create two dangerous sources of opposition, one of which led to the fall of the government in 1909, while the other pursued him for the rest of his career. The latter was the opposition of the Labor party and the Socialists. In spite of his republicanism and radicalism he was too vigorous an individualist to share the workers' views of the right to strike. In the miners' stoppage at Courrières, after an awful explosion, with his usual courage he went alone into the district, and personally addressed the men. Although he won their respect, he could not win their support, and he permanently estranged them by his use of armed forces. This use of the military he resorted to again when he mobilized the sappers to provide Paris with light during the electrical strike, an episode which led to the whole opposing principles of individualism and socialism being debated between Clemenceau and Jaurès in two historic sittings of the Chamber. The debate offered a striking contrast between the picturesque, emotional and gesticulating charm and ringing voice of the otherwise unattractive personality of Jaurès and the quiet, steady but burningly incisive logic of Clemenceau's short and almost conversational form of oratory. The enmity of the Labor forces was definitely crystallized by Clemenceau's rapidly decisive use of troops to suppress the anarchistic wine strike of 1907, which involved destruction of public buildings and organized ref[usal] to pay taxes.

The other cause of opposition, wh[ich] it might be said Clemenceau almost willfully created against himself, was his attitude on foreign affairs. It eventually culminated in a debate, which was little more than a violently personal contest between Clemenceau and Delcassé, and allowed the latter to satisfy an old enmity by bringing about the fall of the government. The theme was Morocco, but the principle involved was the friendship of Great Britain. Throughout his career Clemenceau's two chief aims in foreign policy were to discourage colonial expansion and to work toward a Franco-British understanding. The latter he triumphantly achieved during the course of his Ministry in the face of endless difficulties and prejudices. The former he was induced virtually to sacrifice by having to pursue the Moroccan intervention, which Delcassé had left as a legacy of his long control of the French Foreign Office. Delcassé was ultimately no doubt a friend of Great Britain also, although he worked through the devious way of an Anglo-Russian entente as leading to a triple entente, but while he was responsible for the Anglo-French convention of 1904, some earlier expressions of his policy were not very friendly to British colonial policy. On

Wide World

Clemenceau at the age of 10

the other hand, Clemenceau's distrust of colonial adventures, as dissipating forces which might at any time be needed nearer home, in itself disposed him to be more tolerant of British claims.

Delcassé, it will be remembered, in 1905 opposed the growing German influence in Morocco, and eventually refused to join in a European conference to consider its relations with the great powers. That refusal led to Germany forcing his resignation. The early part of 1906 saw the Algeciras conference, in which Great Britain supported France, with a resulting settlement, which was favorable to French contentions. In 1907 came the French occupation of Casablanca, and in 1908 General Amade's advance deep into the interior, and Clemenceau's declaration —so contrary to the principle which had previously guided him in colonial policy—that France would not evacuate Morocco. In 1909 came the Franco-German agreement and Germany's assurances that her interests in Morocco were purely economic, but in 1911 there was the Agadir incident, which was settled by the Franco-German convention and followed by the declaration of the French protectorate in 1912. Clemenceau, who was by this time in opposition, returned to his old principles by opposing the ratification of the convention in a speech in which he used the since famous phrase, "We desire peace, but if war is forced upon us, we shall be there."

Warnings of War

After the fall of his government, which seemed again to have ended his political career, Clemenceau went on a lecturing tour in Argentina, from which he returned at the end of 1910 to found *L'Homme Libre* with a new group of collaborators, among whom for the first time appears George Mandel, that curious personality, afterward so familiar in the corridors of the Peace Conference. During the two years before the war, Clemenceau in his paper constantly warned his countrymen to sink their differences and prepare for war. When war eventually broke out, he continued as a patriotic but outspoken critic of the government, and toward the end of 1914, *L'Homme Libre* was suppressed by the censorship, only to reappear immediately afterward as *L'Homme Enchainé*. The general line which he took on strategy was always for concentration upon the Western front, but at this time he had no official connection with the national defense except as president of the War Commission of the Senate.

On Nov. 16, 1917, Clemenceau, at the age of nearly 77, once more became Prime Minister of France, this time to face a grave national crisis. He was faced with the task of rescuing his nation from the grasp of defeatists, revolutionists, and socialists, and inspiring her with a will to victory which would win the war. During the first three years of the war Clemenceau had won a name f himself as an uncompromising nationalist, an opponent of all defeatism. He had fought the government in 1915 for its failure to supply the adequate munitions and food; he had attacked Millerand, then Minister of War, for what he considered his

CLEMENCEAU IN 1879
The famous portrait painted by Edouard Manet

weak conduct of the struggle. In a famous debate in the Chamber in 1917 he attacked the defeatists, demanding that Malvy, Minister of the Interior, take repressive measures against all who advocated peace without victory. The debate caused the resignation of Malvy and the fall of the Ribot Cabinet, followed soon after by the fall of the subsequent Painlevé Cabinet. Now, despite the support of patriotic opinion, he had strong opposition to meet. He was thwarted by the Socialists on one side, by the money interests on the other, while his personal relations with President Poincaré were anything but cordial. The money interests were perhaps his most dangerous enemy, especially as they had the support of the clever Caillaux, who was disposed to come to terms with Germany and end the war. Caillaux had, indeed, already desired a Franco-German understanding before the war, even at the expense of British good-will, and he was a thorn in the flesh of Clemenceau, whose proudest boast and whose answer to all criticisms was: "*Je fais la guerre, je fais la guerre*." This thorn Clemenceau did not tolerate for long. In January, 1918, Caillaux was arrested, but only after Clemenceau had threatened to resign if the arrest was not agreed to. Caillaux was eventually condemned to the forfeiture of civil rights and to banishment from Paris. Meanwhile, Bolo Pasha had been executed for treason in 1918, and Malvy, the former Minister of the Interior, had been exiled. In the Spring of 1918 occurred the great Ludendorff offensive, the American troops began to arrive, Foch was made a Marshal by Clemenceau, later becoming Commander-in-Chief of all the allied forces, and by November, 1918, the war was won. It was the climax of Clemenceau's career. At his death it was said of him: "To M. Clemenceau more than to any one man belongs the credit for bringing the war to a successful conclusion for the Allies."

The debt which France owes to Clemenceau's gallant inspiration and fiery and tireless energy during the years 1917-1918 cannot be exaggerated. His visits to the soldiers in the trenches became a legend. He turned up everywhere, and the words, "Good morning, gentlemen," with which he invariably greeted a group of soldiers, had just the right touch of fine republican equality with which a civilian knows no rank.

M. Clemenceau held his position as Premier until 1919, attending the Versailles Peace Conference as head of the French delegation and as president of the conference. With Lloyd George and Orlando he consistently fought Wilson's fourteen points, demanding al-

ways the utmost possible security and indemnification for France, the left bank of the Rhine, the complete demilitarization of Germany, and the maintenance of the old system of alliances. The result was a compromise, in which Clemenceau grudgingly accepted the League of Nations to gain his other points.

Having gained most of what he wanted, he returned to Paris, and, in November, 1919, resigned as Prime Minister, but only because his friends had persuaded him that his election as President of the republic in the following January was assured. But his work was done. He had displeased the Left by his stern demands at the peace conference, and he had displeased the Right by his ignoring of them during the closing days of the war. Like so many previous confident Presidential candidates whose defeat he had contrived, he was this time himself defeated. He then announced his final retirement from public life, and although his name appeared as founder on the front page of Tardieu's paper, *L'Echo National,* which started in 1921 and has since come to an end, he took no further part in public affairs except to give a series of lectures in the United States at the end of 1922 on America's responsibilities with regard to Europe.

Clemenceau's Personality

His appearance and personality at the time of the Peace Conference have often been described. His square-tailed black coat, his gray suede gloves, which he never took off, his buckled shoes were indispensable parts of his external aspect. The apparent sleepiness of the protective lethargy, with which he reserved his incisiveness and mordant wit for special occasions, was well expressed by the drooping eyelids in that almost parchment-skinned face and in the comparative silence with which he allowed most of the talking to be done by his subordinates. Those, however, who were privileged to see him in his home at 8 Rue Franklin, an old-fashioned apartment in an old-fashioned house among modern surroundings, are better able to judge the extraordinary versatility and sparkling energy of his mind. Calling on him one morning at 9 o'clock, when he was more than 80 years old, I waited in his study, the typical workroom of a well traveled and well read man of letters and amateur of the arts. There were books on all the chairs as well as on the shelves in that ordered confusion which indicates constant reference. On the walls modern paintings hung beside photographs of Greece and Italy, and in the middle of the room was that large horse-shoe-shaped writing table in the middle of whose semi-circle Clemenceau would sit and talk, his

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CLEMENCEAU AND COLONEL HOUSE
In France for the Peace Conference, Colonel House visited the French statesman at his country place at Saint Vincent-sur-Jar

black skull-cap on his head. As he came in and greeted me in excellent English, he explained that he had been obliged to keep me waiting because he had not yet finished the athletic exercises which he had every morning after his bath. And as we know, these exercises he kept up until just before his death at the age of 88.

His life and his habits were simple. He was a teetotaler. He cared nothing for society, though he was a brilliant conversationalist among his own friends. Conversation, indeed, was the manner of his oratory severely logical, in short sentences, without gestur[illegible], and always on the attack rather than the defense. He was a master of quick retort and irony. His physical and moral courage was tremendous. He was a duelist to be feared, a left-hand swordsman and a perfect pistol shot. His honesty was absolute, and he was never other than a poor man.

No respecter of persons nor of party, Clemenceau relentlessly disregarded individual claims at all times. If he had the habit of saying uncomplimentary things behind the backs of his colleagues and subordinates as well as of his opponents, he had equally the habit of saying the same things to their faces. He was what the French call *"cassant."* His orders were laconic and peremptory, and he was impatient of discussion; but if he broke men as readily as he broke talk, it was with so disinterested a purpose of putting better men in their places that he commanded respect. His recognition of service was almost entirely negative, but so loyal was he in his own transparent patriotism, and so unsparing of himself, as of others, that the service which he was able to command was devoted.

Cl[illegible]eau's philosophy might be de[illegible]as humanist-materialist. T[illegible]at bottom a profound p[illegible]ndly and sympathe[illegible]n politics he was alwa[illegible]the oppressed, but n[illegible] change in the social sy[illegible] could not accept anything[illegible] individualist, and his only[illegible] ress was that under an indiv[illegible] system the heart of man might[illegible] softened.

In the years of his compara[illegible]tirement from politics, he made[illegible] excursions into literature. H[illegible] four volumes of essays, ske[illegible] articles, which appeared fro[illegible] time in the various newspapers[illegible] he directed, and by no means[illegible] these dealt directly with politic[illegible] social subjects. He published a [illegible] *Les Plus Forts.* Its theme was[illegible] contest between the real father and th[illegible] legal father of the heroine, and it had been originally written as a play, which was never produced. Another dramatic work, a sentimental duologue in one act, called *Le Retour de Cythère,* was about to be acted in Paris when the war broke out, but has never yet been seen. His one-act play was, however, quite sufficient to make a literary reputation. This was *La Voile du Bonheur,* a Chinese story in two acts, produced by Gémier in 1901. Its tenderly pessimist philosophy and touching refusal to see the ugliness of life well represented its author's kindliest side. Finally, his summing up of his whole philosophy of life, translated into English under the title *In the Evening of My Thought* (reviewed in CURRENT HISTORY, December, 1929, page 428), appeared only a little while before his death.

PARIS, November, 1929.

Naval Reduction: What It Means in Money

By BURTON L. FRENCH

CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE NAVY APPROPRIATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

DURING THE FISCAL YEAR which ended on June 30, 1929, the United States spent upon her navy $374,608,054, or more than [illegible] as much as Germany spent [illegible] Great Britain, in her last fiscal year spent $274,000,000. The United States has 300,000 tons of naval craft over and above what Germany had in [illegible] and, measured by the standards of fifteen years ago, a vastly superior fleet. Eighty-two per cent of the revenues of the United States is applied for expenses occasioned by past wars or for military purposes looking to the future. Similar burdens rest upon other nations. Not to modify this program by radical reduction of armaments is sheer madness. Humanity believes that as a result of the conversations between President Hoover for the United States and Prime Minister MacDonald for Great Britain, and the approaching naval conference touching the burden of naval establishments, momentous events are in the offing.

The naval tonnage of the leading powers of the world, upon the basis of data furnished by the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department, of Oct. 18, 1929, is as follows:

	Built	Building and Appropriated For	*Total
United States	1,329,353	204,020	1,533,373
Great Britain	1,587,037	178,640	1,765,677
Japan	915,547	90,940	1,006,487
France	548,563	161,003	709,506
Italy	407,405	116,979	524,384
Germany	123,290	34,000	157,290
Russia	133,026	15,200	148,226

*Figured in standard displacement, totals would be slightly different.

The foregoing includes the tonnage of capital ships, cruisers and airplane carriers under 20 years of age, destroyers under 16 and submarines and mine-layers under 13. There is omitted considerable older tonnage and auxiliary craft such as transports, tenders and hospital ships.

In man power the navies, including officers and men of the naval establishments, compare as follows (Office of Naval Intelligence):

United States	*93,323
Great Britain	†89,007
Japan	81,595
France	60,834
Italy	45,397
Germany	14,997
Russia	‡32,000

*Number provided in 1929-30 budget. Omits United States Marine Corps, about 19,175 officers and men. Omits Coast Guard, about 12,127 officers and men.

†Number provided in 1929-30 budget. Omits British Marine Corps, about 10,249 officers and men. Omits Dominion navies, about 10,000 officers and men. Omits assigned officers and men from naval aviation. Includes civilian personnel, about 4,100.

‡Budgetary figures 1928

Measured by officers and men afloat, the navies of the United States and Great Britain are almost identical, Great Britain having 67,812 and the United States 66,311, plus a limited number of marines who are assigned to duty that otherwise would devolve upon the naval enlisted personnel. (Based upon Naval Appropriations Hearings, United States, for 1930, pages 95-96.)

The money cost of the navies of the several powers for 1904 and for the

ck skull-cap on his head. A... and ...

last fiscal year is as follows (in dol-lars):

	Fiscal Year 1904	Fiscal Year 1929	Increase or Decrease
U. S.	109,196,123	374,608,054	265,411,931
Gt. Brit	173,548,058	278,478,000	104,929,942
Japan	17,553,279	131,222,722	113,669,443
France	59,740,222	99,568,000	39,827,778
Italy	23,522,400	63,622,982	40,100,582
Germany	50,544,000	47,764,019	2,779,981
Russia	60,018,895	42,329,289	17,689,606

Some qualification must be made in attempting to compare naval strength upon the basis of money appropriated. This is true in part because of the difference in purchasing power of money in the several countries, reflected in both material and personnel (civil and military) costs, to the variation in the sources of needed raw materials, and in part because of the difference in human efficiency.

Increase in 25 Years

No one can compare the appropriations of 1904 with those of twenty-five years later without being astounded at the enormity of the increases made by certain of the world powers.

Consider for a moment the general situation with the thought of arriving at a conclusion whether or not there is any justification for the increase that has occurred or for its maintenance. World conditions today are less threatening than they were twenty-five years ago. The world powers economically are less capable of warfare than they were in 1904. The leading powers of the world have gone through the ordeal of a war that has punished them beyond human tongue to describe and has settled upon the peoples of the respective countries burdens of indebtedness from which they will not emerge within three generations.

Consider the relative positions of the nations that are making the enormous expenditures of money for naval establishments. Measured by sea power, in contrast with 1904, the United States has risen from fourth or fifth place to a place shared only with Great Britain. Upon the basis of tonnage the United States is two and one-half times as powerful as France, three and one-half times as powerful as Italy and six to seven times as powerful as R... Germany. Her naval power is g... than the combined naval power o... the nations of Europe with the exc... tion of Great Britain, or all the nations of the world outside Europe.

From the standpoint of Great Britain's navy precisely similar comparisons may be made.

Regardless of the close relationship between Great Britain and the United States, and no matter with what fine words naval programs in both Great Britain and the United States may be justified, the bald and unpleasant fact remains that naval rivalry is going forward between these two great English-speaking nations, and a navy-building war is on between them. This rivalry challenges Japan and France and Italy and Germany to great nava... expenditures, and though they all real... ize that in wealth and man power an... national resources they are outclass... by the two great world powers, for t... sake of national pride and what th... imagine is prestige they are doing th... best to keep up with the procession.

If nations are not stark mad, a ... should be found for them to re... their naval burdens without surre... ing one whit of dignity or pre... But the nations will need to act i... cert. Great Britain at this mom... ahead in cruisers; the United St... ahead in destroyers and subm... while Japan in cruiser st... is above what would be a 5-5-3... The lead should be taken by Britain, the United States and while the other nations of the that approach most nearly t... in naval strength should have in the international program reduction, not by way of stand not by way of using reduction leading powers as a means of ing their own naval strength, justification for reduction of t... navies.

It is folly for a nation o... population and corresponding... resources to consider main... navy equal to the greatest. T... nation could not possibly

in a building race, while, on ...her hand, it is within the power ...he smaller nation to block reduc-...on of the larger by taking advantage of moderation upon the part of the stronger nations.

POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS

Omitting all attempts to define a "yardstick," let us point to reductions that should be made and that can be made.

A limitation of number of ships of the different types is not the only end to be attained if a naval conference is to be worth while. The limitation must be downward. Big-navy advocates will readily agree to limits in categories if the limit be high enough—in number of cruisers, for instance, if the number be placed so high that it will keep navy yards at work and maintain a constant ship-building program. Indeed, such a limitation might be a stimulus to naval construction, should it be above what any of the contracting parties may feel is necessary to meet its own needs in any type. It would give every advocate of more and more ships argument for urging speedy attainment of the designated number, just as today propagandists are urging speediest action on airplane carriers and on programs looking to replacement of capital ships under the treaty of 1922, without waiting to see if perchance a conference may reduce the number or extend the time of replacement.

Agreement of equality or in ratio is not enough unless that agreement is premised upon reduction in tonnage in types of ships in such a way as to reduce man power and money cost.

Under the terms of the Washington Conference of 1922, the tonnage of battleships was fixed at the equivalent of 525,000 each for the United States and Great Britain, 315 000 for Japan, and 175,000 each for France and for Italy. No ship other than certain ones that were being built at the time of the treaty may be constructed with a tonnage in excess of 35 000. The treaty provides an order of replacement in

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THE BATTLESHIP CALIFORNIA

...ng a broadside in target practice. The California costs $2 200,000 a year to run and would cost $40 000 000 to build today